Nachfolgend finden Sie die Links zu den im Buch in den jeweiligen Kapiteln zitierten Internetseiten. Klicken Sie zunächst auf das jeweilige Kapitel.


Das komplette Literaturverzeichnis finden Sie hier

  • Nachbereiter, Vorbereiter

  • 2 Die Kommission
  • 3 Der Autor: Philip Zelikow
  • 4 Der Kopf: Osama Bin Laden
  • 5 Die Finanzierung
  • 6 Die Verbindung: Omar Said Sheikh
  • 7 Der Kronzeuge: Khalid Scheich Mohammed
  • Terroristen, Sündenböcke und Agenten

  • 8 Der Ringleader: Mohammed Atta
  • 9 Die Hijacker: eindeutig identifi ziert
  • 10 Verwechselt: die Al-Omaris
  • 11 Der Anschlag: perfekt vorbereitet
  • 12 Die Geheimdienste: ohne Vorkenntnisse
  • 13 Intermezzo: getürkt
  • 14 Vorauswissen: Umzugshelfer
  • 15 Vorauswissen: Kunststudenten
  • 16 Vorauswissen: Insider-Händler
  • 17 Die schützende Hand
  • Politik und andere Posten

  • 18 Bush in Sarasota
  • 19 Dienst nach Vorschrift
  • 20 Auf verlassenem Posten
  • 21 Intermezzo: Schwundgeld
  • Auf den Schirmen, unter dem Teppich

  • 22 Manöver jenseits der Vorstellungskraft
  • 23 Das Militär: zu spät informiert
  • 24 Das Gespenst: Phantomfl ug AA 11
  • 25 American 11: Augenzeugen an Bord
  • 26 United 93: zu früh, zu spät
  • 27 United 93: kein Abschuss
  • 28 Täter-Kommunikation: Gedankenübertragung
  • 29 Irrelevant: Raytheon
  • 30 Der Pilot: Hani Hanjour
  • 31 Der Pentagon-Crash
  • 32 E4-B: Überwachung von oben
  • Aufgeräumt, eingestürzt

  • 33 WTC 1 und 2
  • 34 WTC 7
  • 35 Silverstein: unvorbereitet
  • Stillschweigend, der Rest

  • 36 United 23
  • 37 Intermezzo: Anthrax
  • 38 Whistleblower

Sollten Sie alle Links in einer Abfolge bevorzugen, klicken Sie hier

2) Die Kommission

  1. Shenon, The Commission, S. 29
  2. Ebd., S. 39
  3. Vgl. History Commons, »December 16, 2002: Members of 9/11 Commission Have Po- tential Conflicts of Interest«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a121602otherconflicts#a121602otherconflicts
  4. History Commons, »March 26, 2003: President Bush Turns Down Increased Budget for 9/11 Commission«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a032603com missionfunding#a032603commissionfunding
  5. Shenon, The Commission, S. 30 f.
  6. Ebd., S. 388
  7. Kean u.a., Without Precedent, S. 82 ff.
  8. Ebd., S. 120 ff.
  9. Ebd., S. 14
  10. Ebd., S. 321
  11. Nur 16 Prozent aller Amerikaner stimmten 2006 der Frage zu, ob die Bush-Regie- rung in Sachen 9/11 die Wahrheit sage; im Mai 2002, vor der Veröffentlichung des Commission Report, waren es noch 21 Prozent gewesen.

3) Der Autor: Philip Zelikow

  1. Miller Center Report, »Thinking about Political History«, Winter 1999, S. 5 ff.;
    http://replay.web.archive.org/20090301022031/http://webstorage1.mcpa.virginia.edu/library/mc/mcreport/vol14_num3.pdf
  2. Carter u.a., Catastrophic Terrorism; www.hks.harvard.edu/visions/publication/terrorism.htm
  3. Vgl. Stinnett, Pearl Harbor
  4. Shenon, The Commission, S. 104
  5. Zit.n. Emad Mekay, »War Launched to Protect Israel – Bush Adviser», Inter Press Ser- vice, 29.3.2004; http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=23083
  6. Thomas Donelly u.a., Rebuilding America's Defenses. Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century, A Report of The Project for the New American Century, Septem- ber 2000; www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf

4) Der Kopf: Osama Bin Laden

  1. Die dutzendfach belegten Osama-Bin-Laden-Zitate sind hier exemplarisch zit.n.
    Laurent, 9/11/01, S. 250 ff. Eine ausführliche Zusammenstellung der weiteren Dementi Bin Ladens hier: http://www.911-archiv.net/debunking-of-debunkers/ allgemein/obl-dementiert-jede-beteiligung-an-911.html
  2. Ebd., S. 252
  3. Vgl. AP, 14.12.2001: »Bin Laden misrepresents islamic teachings«; www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/12/13/tape-scholars.htm
  4. Laurent, 9/11/01, S. 257, mit Verweis auf den ARD-Monitor vom 22.12.2001 sowie www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/Afghanistan/laden-video.html
  5. Ein Video sagt mehr als tausend Bilder – z.B. hier: www.metacafe.com/watch/364528/is_he_bin_laden
  6. In der Sahih Al-Bukhari heißt es dazu (unter Nr. 6222), Hervorhebung von uns: »Der Prophet, Allahs Segen und Friede auf ihm, befahl uns sieben Dinge und verbot uns andere sieben Dinge: Er befahl uns, den Kranken zu besuchen, an dem Beerdi- gungszug teilzunehmen, dem Niesenden Barmherzigkeit zu wünschen, dem Einla- denden Folge zu leisten, den Friedensgruß zu erwidern, dem Unterdrückten zu hel- fen und den Eidleistenden bei Erfüllung seines Eids zu unterstützen. Dagegen verbot er uns sieben Dinge: Goldringe – oder Goldschmuck – zu tragen, Seide, feine Seide, Seidenbrokat und mit Seide gemischte Stoffe anzuziehen.«; http://islamische-datenbank.de/option,com_buchari/action,viewhadith/chapterno,71/min,80/show,10/
  7. www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten/fugitives/laden.htm
  8. Rex Tomb, Leiter der FBI-Presseabteilung, zit.n. Ed Haas, Muckracker Report, 6.6.2006: »The Reason why 9/11 is not mentioned on Usama Bin Laden's Most Wanted Page is be- cause the FBI has no hard evidence connecting Bin Laden to 9/11.«; http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20090421105709/http://muckrakerreport.com/id267.html
  9. Florian Rötzer, »Bin Laden gibt sich staatsmännisch«, in: Telepolis, 30.10.2004; www.heise.de/tp/artikel/18/18692/1.html; ders., »Das Al-Qaida-Videoband zum Jahrestag«, in: Telepolis, 8.9.2006; www.heise.de/tp/artikel/23/23511/1.html
  10. George W. Bush in einer White-House-Pressekonferenz, März 2002; http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20030405074947/http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/text/20020313-8.html
  11. General Richard Myers im CNN-Interview, 6.4.2002; http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20020410092932/http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04082002_t407genm.html

5) Die Finanzierung

  1. Commission Report, S. 172: »The 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.«; www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
  2. Ebd., S. 172: »To date, the US government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately the question is of little practical significance.«
  3. Ebd., S. 169: »The origin of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9/11.«
  4. Ebd., S. 172: »Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government – or foreign government official– supplied any funding.«
  5. Ebd., S. 172 (Hervorhebungen von uns): »The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda … Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky

6) Die Verbindung: Omar Said Sheikh

  1. 1 Exakte Wissenschaftler werden einwenden, das sei nicht ganz richtig, denn ISI-Chef
    Mahmud Omar werde sehr wohl erwähnt, und zwar gleich zweimal, im Zusammen- hang mit diplomatischen Fragen in der Ära nach 9/11, der Geheimdienst selbst so- gar ein einziges Mal wegen einer früheren Unterstützung Al-Qaidas. Den entschei- denden Omar Said Sheikh hingegen sucht man tatsächlich ganz und gar vergeblich.
  2. Siehe u.a. »Gen Mahmud's Exit Due to Links with Umar Sheikh«, in: Dawn, 8.10.2001; http://web.archive.org/web/20011011083446/http://www.dawn. com/2001/10/09/top13.htm
  3. Siehe u.a. »UK Move To Allow Entry To Ultra Alarms Abducted Britons«, in: Press Trust Of India, 3.1.2000; www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20000104/ian04025.html
  4. Die ausführlichste Darstellung des Falls findet sich in Lévy, Wer hat Daniel Pearl er- mordet?, S. 96 ff.
  5. Tariq Ali, »Who Really Killed Daniel Pearl? The US is Ignoring Evidence of Links With Pakistan's Secret Service«, in: Guardian, 5.4.2002; www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/apr/05/pressandpublishing.pakistan
  6. Newsweek berichtet am 12.2.2002 nicht nur von Omar Said Sheikhs eigenartigem Ver- halten vor Gericht, sondern auch, der Verdächtige sei bereits eine Woche vorher vom ISI festgenommen worden; www.newsweek.com/2002/02/24/a-struggle-in-the-shadows.html
  7. Chaim Kupferberg, »There's Something About Omar: Truth, Lies, and The Legend of 9/11«, auf Global Research, 21.10.2003; http://globalresearch.ca/articles/KUP310A.html
  8. Paul Thompson, »Sept. 11's Smoking Gun. The Many Faces of Saeed Sheikh«, auf His- tory Commons, 25.2.2003; www.historycommons.org/essay.jsp?article=essaysaeed
  9. Walther, Der zensierte Tag, S. 159 ff.
  10. Siehe Fielding u.a., Masterminds of Terror
  11. Z.B. auf Spiegel-online; www.spiegel.de/panorama/zeitgeschichte/0,1518,435706,00.html
  12. Exemplarisch dafür »Operation heiliger Dienstag«, in: Der Spiegel 44/03, 27.10.2003, S. 120–135; www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-28990723.html
  13. UPI Exclusive, 30.9.2002: »Pearl Tracked Al-Qaida«; www.upi.com/Top_News/2002/09/30/UPI-Exclusive-Pearl-tracked-al-Qaida/UPI-94071033424088/
  14. 2007 schwebte das Verfahren noch immer, jüngere Berichte fehlen unseres Wissens, außer dass Omar Said Sheikh laut einem Bericht der pakistanischen Dawn Ende 2008 beinahe per Telefonscherz aus dem Knast einen Atomkrieg zwischen Pakistan und Indien ausgelöst hätte. Siehe »Jailed militant's hoax calls drove India, Pakistan to brink of war«; in: Dawn, 26.11.2009; www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geo political-issues/39973-jailed-militant-s-hoax-calls-drove-india-pakistan-brink-war.html. Der Mann hat offenbar einen interessanten Nummernspeicher in seinem Handy, aber wir gestehen, dass uns das nicht wundert.
  15. Michael Meacher, »The Pakistan Connection«, in: Guardian, 22.7.2004: »Signifi- cantly, [Saeed] Sheikh is … the man who, on the instructions of General Mahmood Ahmed, the then head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), wired $100,000 before the 9/11 attacks to Mohamed Atta, the lead hijacker. It is extraordinary that neither Ahmed nor Sheikh have been charged and brought to trial on this count. Why not?«; www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jul/22/usa.september11
  16. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 21.8.2006, Interview von Evan Solomon. Das Video »9/11: truth, lies and conspiracy« ist auf der CBC-Seite nicht mehr zu finden,aber ein (kommentiertes) Transkript findet sich unter http://911blogger.com/news/2006-10-21/911-truth-lies-and-conspiracy-interview-lee-hamilton.
  17. Arnaud de Borchgrave, »Commentary: The Real Culprit of 9/11?«, UPI 22.6.2004; auch: www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline& startpos=5600#a072204fullyinvolved
  18. Al-Dschasira 2.11.2007: »Frost all over the World«; Video hier: http://w-o-e.blogspot.com/2008/01/bbc-censors-bhuttos-bin-laden-murder.html

7) Der Kronzeuge: Khalid Scheich Mohammed

  1. Siehe Fouda u.a. Masterminds of Terror. Fouda und sein Bericht sind umstritten. Ursprünglich hieß es, der Journalist habe KSM und dessen Komplizen Ramsi Binal- shibh im Juni oder August 2002 an einem geheimen Ort in Karatschi interviewt. De- tails und einen Tonmitschnitt präsentierte Fouda aber erst Anfang September 2002, die versprochenen Videoaufzeichnungen blieb er bis heute schuldig. Die Interviews, das erste »umfassende Eingeständnis hochrangiger Mitarbeiter aus Bin Ladens Netz- werk, dass man 9/11 ausführte« (Londoner Times), waren den meisten Beobachtern von Anfang an suspekt, Experten bezweifelten die Echtheit der Bänder ebenso wie das zufällige Timing der Veröffentlichungen. James Drummond, »Doubts Over Latest Terrror Videos«, in: Financial Times, 11.9.2002: »Analysts cited the crude editing of [Fouda's interview] tapes and the ti- ming of the broadcasts as reasons to be suspicious about their authenticity. Dia Rashwan, an expert on Islamist movements at the Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies in Cairo, said: ›I have very serious doubts [about the authenticity of this tape]. It could have been a script written by the FBI.‹«; http://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2002/financialtimes091102.html
  2. History Commons, »June 16, 2002: 9/11 Mastermind KSM Reported Captured«: »In September 2002, articles appear in the Pakistani and Indian press suggesting that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is actually captured on this day in an apartment in Karachi. Supposedly he has been sent to the US, though the US and Pakistan deny the story and say Mohammed has not been captured at all.«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a061602ksmmaybecaptured#a06160=4600#a061602ksmmaybecaptured
  3. History Commons, »June 14, 2002 and Shortly After: Al Jazeera Leak Leads US Intel- ligence to KSM and Bin Al-Shibh«: »US intelligence begins an intense surveillance of Karachi in an attempt to find KSM and bin al-Shibh. Mostly because of this lead, bin al-Shibh will be arrested in Karachi in September 2002. … Interestingly, in early September 2002, it will be reported that KSM was arrested in an apartment in Kara- chi on June 16, 2002, which would be right about when the CIA was given this infor- mation.«; www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=khalid+sheikh+mohammed&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go History Commons, »April, June, or August 2002: Al Jazeera Reporter Claims to Con- duct Interview with 9/11 Masterminds«: »KSM is later variously reported to be ar- rested in June 2002, killed or arrested in September 2002, and then arrested in March 2003.«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0402foudainterview#a0402foudainterview
  4. Observer, 15.9.2002:»Would-be hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh is arrested after a huge gunfight in Karachi, Pakistan, involving thousands of police.«; www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/sep/15/pakistan.terrorism Was KSM betrifft, gehen die Meinun- gen und Berichte auseinander. Laut Asia Times vom 30.10.2002 wurde er bei der Razzia erschossen – www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DJ30Df01.html –, laut Australian Broadcasting Corp. vom 2.3.2002 auf der Flucht erschossen –http://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2003/australianbc030203.html–, laut Time Maga-zine vom 20.1.2003 wurde jemand erschossen, der ihm ähnlich sah – www.time.com/time/asia/covers/1030127/ksm.html –, laut Los Angeles Times vom 22.12.2002 entkam KSM um Haaresbreite, während seine Frau und seine Kinder festgenommen wurden – http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20030204024615/http://www.latimes.com/services/site/registration/view.reg?temp=rc-restricted .
  5. Vgl. Syed Saleem Shahzad: »A chilling inheritance of terror«, in: Asia Times, 30.10.2002: »But now it emerges that an Arab woman and a child were taken to an ISI safe house, where they identified the Shaikh Mohammed's body as their husband and father. The body was kept in a private NGO mortuary for 20 days before being buried, under the surveillance of the FBI, in a graveyard in the central district of Karachi.«; www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DJ30Df01.html
  6. Zu den diversen Widersprüchen der diversen angeblichen Festnahmen vgl. History Commons: »Early 2003: KSM Possibly Arrested in Karachi«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly03ksmarrestkarachi#aearly03ksmarrestkarachi; so- wie: »KSM Reportedly Arrested in Pakistan, But Doubts Persist«; www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=torture,_rendition,_and_other_abuses_against_captives_in_iraq,_afghanistan,_and_elsewhere&startpos=500#a030103mohammedarrest
  7. Kean u.a., Without Precedent, S. 115. Die Vorsitzenden der Kommission verlegen den Festnahmeort ohne Angabe von Gründen wieder zurück in den Juli 2002. Kean und Hamilton scheinen sich sich aber nicht im Mindesten bewusst zu sein, dass sie drei Festnahmedaten, zwei Festnahmeorte sowie die widersprüchlichen Beteiligungen diverser Geheimdienste einfach unter »Karatschi, März 2003, Mastermind inhaf- tiert« subsumieren.
  8. Pete Williams, »Terror Arrests Came Amid Active Plots«, MSNBC, 3.3.2003: »Some analysts questioned whether Mohammed was actually arrested Saturday, specula- ting that he may have been held for some time and that the news was made public when it was in the interests of the United States and Pakistan.«
  9. Olga Craig, »CIA Holds Young Sons of Captured al-Qa'eda Chief«, in: The Telegraph, 9.3.2003; www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1424123/CIA- holds-young-sons-of-captured-al-Qaeda-chief.html
  10. Kean u.a., Without Precedent, S. 122: »We were told that even the President of the United States didn't know were these top al qaeda detainees were.«
  11. Eine Geschichte des Waterboarding unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Prakti- ken in US-amerikanischen Gefängnissen nach 9/11 findet sich in den History Com- mons unter www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=torture,_rendition,_and_other_abuses_against_captives_in_iraq,_afghanistan,_and_elsewhere&startpos=1400#a041809emptywheel266. Besondere Beachtung verdient hier der Eintrag »April 18, 2009: Blogger, Not Reporters, Discover Information regarding Number of Times Suspected Terrorists Waterboarded«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a041809emptywheel266#a041809emptywheel266. Ein Fachmann und Agent erklärt hier – nicht kleinlich –, man habe dem Inhaftierten zwar 183-mal Was- ser in den Hals gegossen, ihn aber eigentlich ja nur fünfmal »watergeboardet«, denn die 183 Erstickungsportionen seien ja im Rahmen von nur fünf Folterungen verab- reicht worden. Das ist natürlich was ganz anderes! Folter, ja, gut, aber nicht so dolle Folter.
  12. NBC, 31.1.08: »The NBC News analysis shows that more than one quarter of all footnotes in the 9/11 Report refer to CIA interrogations of al-Qaida operatives who were subjected to the now-controversial interrogation techniques. In fact, information derived from the interrogations is central to the Report's most critical chapters, those on the planning and execution of the attacks.«; http://web.archive.org/web/20080407223205/http://deepbackground.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/01/30/624314.aspx
  13. Kean u.a., Without Precedent, S. 14
  14. Ebd., S. 119–123. Hier findet sich eine vollständige und erschütternde Schilderung des »Stonewalling« und der Behinderung von Ermittlungen durch CIA (Tenet per- sönlich) und DoD (Rumsfeld persönlich) – was unter allen anderen Umständen strafbar wäre. Den Ermittlern der Kommission wurde keinerlei Zugang zu den Ge- fangenen gewährt, nicht mal ein Blick durch »one-way glass« oder Kontakt »over the telephone« (S. 122). Es gab nicht einmal Abschriften der Verhöre (S. 121) und kei- nen Zugang selbst für Mitarbeiter, die Kean und Hamilton »blind-folded« bis zum »interrogation point« bringen lassen wollten. Wir empfehlen die vollständige Lek- türe dieser Seiten bei Kerzenlicht und einem guten Fass Strohrum.
  15. Ebd., S. 123. Zur Begründung heißt es: »We simply did not think we could win the argument – in public or in private – in the time available for us.« Schon zur Frage, weshalb man NORAD und FAA nicht per Klage zur Herausgabe zurückgehaltener Dokumente gezwungen habe, machen Kean und Hamilton für ihre nicht besonders gründliche Untersuchung »Zeitgründe« geltend. Sie verweisen aber auch auf das »Versagen« der sonst so zuverlässig auf ihren Nerven herumtrampelnden Angehöri- gen sowie kritischer Journalisten. Die nämlich hätten sich allesamt nicht die Bohne dafür interessiert, ob die Kommission nun Zugang zu den Gefangenen bekam oder nicht. Also: Nicht Kean und Hamilton waren schuld, sondern die Angehörigen. Das musste mal gesagt werden.
  16. Vgl. History Commons, »April, June, or August 2002: Al Jazeera Reporter Claims to Conduct Interview with 9/11 Masterminds«: »Interviewer Fouda is struck that KSM and bin al-Shibh remember only the hijackers' code names, and have trouble re- membering their real names.«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0402foudainterview#a0402foudainterview
  17. Vgl. History Commons, »March 10, 2007: KSM Admits to Long List of Plots, Defends Actions at Military Hearing«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a031007ksmcsrt#a031007ksmcsrt
  18. Vgl. Washington Post, 23.11.2009, »Lawyer: 9/11 Suspects to Plead Not Guilty«; so- wie CBS; www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/23/national/main5745958.shtml
  19. Vgl. Peter Finn u.a., »Opposition to US trial likely to keep mastermind of 9/11 at- tacks in detention«, in: Washington Post, 13.11.2010; www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/12/AR2010111207508.html
  20. NBC, 4.4.2011, »9/11 suspects to Face Military Tribunal, Not NYC Trial«; www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/911-Suspects-to-be-Tried-at-Guantanamo-119184929.html
  21. Das Zitat »total fucking bullshit« stammt aus Vanity Fair vom 16.12.2008 – www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2008/12/torture200812?printable=true¤tPage=all –, aber wir empfehlen den gesamten diesen wichtigen Punkt betreffenden His- tory-Commons-Eintrag zur Lektüre: »August 6, 2007: KSM's Interrogations Could Be 90 Percent Unreliable«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a080607ksmunreliable&scale=0#a080607ksmunreliable

8) Der Ringleader: Mohammed Atta

  1. 1 Dazu ausführlich www.medienanalyse-international.de/schlapphuete.html
  2. Bröckers u.a., Fakten, Fälschungen und die unterdrückten Beweise des 11.9., S. 23 ff.
  3. Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland, sowie Hopsickers aktuelle Berichterstattung auf www.madcowprod.com
  4. Weldon, Countdown to Terror, S. 18; außerdem seine Zeugenaussage »Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing« vom 21.9.2005; www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/092105weldon.html
  5. Goodwin, Jacob, »Inside Able Danger – The Secret Birth, Extraordinary Life and Un- timely Death of a U.S. Military Intelligence Program«, GSN: Government Security News, 2005
  6. »Weldon: Atta Papers Destroyed on Orders«, Associated Press, 16.9.2005; http://web.archive.org/web/20050922032625/http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/print?id=1131137
  7. Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart, S. 270
  8. Siehe die Shaffer-Interviews auf 911 Blogger.com; http://911blogger.com/ news/2010-10-10/911-coverup-judge-napolitano-interviews-col-anthony-shaffer-and-michael-scheuer; http://911blogger.com/news/2010-10-05/exclusive-witnesses-defense-dept-report-suggest-cover-911-findings
  9. Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart, S. 249
  10. So auf der Website des Justizministeriums; www.justice.gov/oig/special/0205/chapter3.htm
  11. »Mohamed Atta in Close Call in Incident at Miami Airport«, New York Times 17.10.2001; http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/national/17ATTA.html
  12. Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland
  13. Daniel Hopsicker, »The Mystery of Fanning Island«; http://www.madcowprod.com/120112006.html
  14. »911 Shuck & Jive at Shuckums«; http://www.madcowprod.com/05192005.html
  15. Commission Report, S. 253: »Atta traveled from Ft Lauderdale, FL, to Baltimore on US Air Flight 2719. According to the BTS database this flight took off at 3.15 p.m«; siehe auch »Wire transfer from Al Shehhi's and Atta's SunTrust account in Ft Lau- derdale, Sep. 7th, 3.58 PM«; http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/prosecution/OG00020-02.pdf; Mitte Mai 2011 fand eine Reporterin den Barmann Toni Amos, der kurz nach 9/11 Venice verlassen hatte. Er hat bis heute ein schlechtes Gewissen, dass er den randalierenden Wodkatrinker Atta damals nicht der Polizei meldete: www.madcowprod.com/05182011.htm
  16. Commission Report, S. 451: »No physical, documentary, or analytical evidence provi- des a convincing explanation of why Atta and Omari drove to Portland, Maine, from Boston on the morning of September 10, only to return to Logan on Flight 5930 on the morning of September 11.«
  17. CNN, 12.9.2001: »Law enforcement officials confirmed that a car was seized at Boston's Logan International Airport and that suspicious materials were found. The Boston Herald said there were Arabic language flight training manuals in the car, but an FBI spokeswoman refused to confirm or deny that report. Meanwhile, in Port- land, Maine, police said that two individuals who traveled by plane from that city to Boston were under investigation. ›I can tell you those two individuals did get on a plane and fly to Boston early yesterday morning,‹ said Portland Police Chief Mike Chitwood. ›I cannot tell you who they are, I cannot tell you where they came from. I can tell you that they are the focus of a federal investigation.‹ He said that the two were recorded on videotape as they went through the Portland Jetport's security cameras. It was not immediately clear whether the two individuals were on any of the hijacked planes. Maine authorities said a car – a rented silver Nissan Altima with Massachusetts plates – was seized from the Portland airport Tuesday evening. Au- thorities believe the two men – possible hijackers – used that car to travel to the air- port, where they boarded an early morning commercial flight to Boston.«; Kopie unter www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2001/september/sep12aa2001.html
  18. Attas Koffer war der einzige, der bei diesem Flug nicht befördert wurde. Paul Sperry, WorldNetDaily.com, 11.9.2002: »Atta was the only passenger among the 81 aboard American Flight whose luggage didn't make the flight.«; www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=28904
  19. www.abc.net.au/4corners/atta/resources/documents/fbiaffidavit13.htm
  20. Vgl. History Commons, »(February-April 2001): Hijacker Atta Possibly Has American Girlfriend; Several Witnesses Confirm Story, Though Supposed Girlfriend Later De- nies the Connection«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0201amanda keller#a0201amandakeller

9) Die Hijacker: eindeutig identifiziert

  1. »Statement of Robert C. Bonner to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,« 26.1.2004; www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7/witness_bonner.htm
  2. BBC, 23.9.2001; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1559151.stm
  3. CBS, 2.11.2001; www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/11/02/attack/main316806.shtml
  4. Der Spiegel, 37/2003, »Panoptikum des Absurden«, S. 58 ff.
  5. In den Monaten und Jahren nach den Anschlägen wurde vielfach berichtet, die ge- borgenen Überreste der »Hijacker« seien eindeutig identfiziert worden – so etwa in »Remains Of Nine Sept. 11 Hijackers Held«, CBS, 17.8.2002; www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/17/attack/main519033.shtml; Tom Gibb, »FBI ends site work, says no bomb used«, in: Post-Gazette News, 25.9.2001; www.post-gazette.com/headlines/20010925scene0925p2.asp; Tom Gibb, »Flight 93 remains yield no evi- dence«, in: Post-Gazette News, 20.12.2001; www.post-gazette.com/headlines/20011220shanksville1220p2.asp
    Das allerdings haben wir schon 2003 (in FFB, S. 65 ff.) als grobe Übertreibung ent- larvt. Denn was da »identifiziert« wurde, waren übrig gebliebene Leichenteile, die man keiner der von Opferangehörigen zur Verfügung gestellten DNA-Muster zuord- nen konnte: »The remains that didn't match any sample we ruled to be the terro- rists«, verkündete Chris Kelly, der Sprecher des Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP). Dieses über den Daumen gepeilte Ausschlussverfahren hat mit einer ordent- lichen, gerichtlich halbwegs »wasserdichten« Identifizierung natürlich nichts zu tun – und an dieser misslichen Lage hat sich bis heute nichts geändert. Im September 2008 berichtete die New York Times, dass von zehn der verdächtigen Hijacker DNA- Proben beim FBI vorlägen, aber konnte immer noch nicht sagen, wer denn nun defi- nitiv identifiziert wurde: »But, since the DNA profiles were unnamed by the bureau, the office could not say which hijackers have been identified, just that 4 of the 10 have been so far.«; www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/us/21hijackers.html
    Warum hat das FBI sieben Jahre später immer noch namenlose DNA-Proben? Die offizielle Ausrede, dass die Angehörigen keine Muster zur Verfügung gestellt hätten – vgl. www.scribd.com/doc/13950025/FBI-Description-of-How-It-Identified-19- Alleged-911-Hijackers –, können wir nicht gelten lassen, denn es gab ja Elefanten- spuren ohne Ende: Hotelzimmer, Mietwagen, hängen gebliebene Koffer, usw. Und die vom BKA zur Verfügung DNA-Probe von Ziad Jarrah, die angeblich zu einem der gefundenen Leichenteile passt, scheint in etwa so aussagekräftig zu sein wie sein »Abschiedsbrief« (t Kap. 13) – also nicht wirklich …
  6. Auf http://replay.web.archive.org/20011007135008/http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/01-spa/09-20-Saud2.htm hieß es am 20.9.2001: »Regarding the in- clusion of Saudi names in the published list of the suspects, Prince Saud commented that haste in publishing the names of suspects has been acknowledged, and that it has been proven that five of the people listed had nothing to do with what happened, adding: ›We very much hope that before being published, information, names and pictures will be verified.‹«
  7. Dokument unter www.broeckers.com/archiv/sb/
  8. History Commons, »September 16, 2001: Couple Reported as Killed on 9/11 Flight Turn up Alive«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a091601judelarson# a091601judelarson
  9. »Statement of Robert C. Bonner to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States«, 26.1.2004; www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/ hearing7/witness_bonner.htm
  10. »FBI: Early probe results show 18 hijackers took part«, CNN, 13.9.2001; http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/13/investigation.terrorism/

10) Verwechselt: die Al-Omaris

  1. www.abc.net.au/4corners/atta/resources/documents/fbiaffidavit11.htm

11) Der Anschlag: perfekt vorbereitet

  1. Shenon, The Commission, S. 52
  2. Los Angeles Times, 10.6.2005; www.mail-archive.com/libertarian@yahoogroups.com/msg00395.html
  3. Daniel Hopsicker, »The Secret World of 9.11. Terrorists, Arms Dealers, & Ghosts in Malawi«, 11.4.2005, auf Mad Cow Morning News; www.madcowprod.com/04112005.html
  4. National Commission, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, S. 32
  5. Wright, The Looming Tower, S. 313
  6. History Commons, »August 6, 2003: Two Investigative Journalists Say Almihdhar and Alhazmi Worked for Saudi Intelligence and Were Protected by CIA«: »After
    9/11, an unnamed former CIA officer who worked in Saudi Arabia will tell investiga- tive journalist Joe Trento that hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were allowed to operate in the US unchecked because they were agents of Saudi Arabia's intelligence agency. ›We had been unable to penetrate al-Qaeda. The Saudis claimed that they had done it successfully. Both Alhazmi and Almihdhar were Saudi agents. We thought they had been screened. It turned out the man responsible for recruiting them had been loyal to Osama Bin Laden. The truth is Bin Laden himself was a Saudi agent at one time. He successfully penetrated Saudi intelligence and created his own operation inside. The CIA relied on the Saudis vetting their own agents. It was a huge mistake. The reason the FBI was not given any information about either man is because they were Saudi assets operating with CIA knowledge in the United Sta- tes.‹«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a97aandasaudiintelligence#a97aandasaudiintelligence

12) Die Geheimdienste: ohne Vorkenntnisse

  1. Eleanor Hill (Staff Director), »The Intelligence Community's Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11, 2001«; 20.9.2002; http://replay.web. archive.org/20020925030010/http://intelligence.senate.gov/0209hrg/020920/hill.pdf (S. 4)
  2. http://web.archive.org/web/20041020144854/http://www.decloah.com/mirrors/9-11/911_Report.txt
  3. National Commission, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, S. 27
  4. History Commons, »September 12, 2001 and Shortly After: 9/11 Hijackers' IDs Are Found in Pentagon Rubble«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a091301moqedid#a091301moqedid

13) Intermezzo: getürkt

  1. www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/prosecution/thumbs/WT00001A.jpg
  2. Hearing der 9/11-Commission, 26.1.2004; www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing7/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-01-26.htm
  3. Guardian, 19.3.2003: »The idea that Mohamed Atta's (sic!) passport had escaped from that inferno unsinged [tests] the credulity of the staunchest supporter of the FBI's crackdown on terrorism.«; www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/19/september11.iraq
  4. Commission Report, S. 525: »Only the passports of Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari were recovered after 9/11. Both had been doctored.«
  5. Ebd., S. 528: »Suqami was the only hijacker not to obtain a U.S. identification docu- ment.«
  6. Ebd.: »for reasons that remain unknown«
  7. CNN, 28.9.2001: »Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller Give an In- vestigation Update«; http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/28/se.20.html
  8. Ashcroft, zit.n. ebd.: »These three documents – this letter is clear evidence linking the hijackers on the three separate flights on September 11.«
  9. Laut FBI-Affidavit waren beide Koffer auf Atta zugelassen; www.abc.net.au/4corners/atta/resources/documents/fbiaffidavit10.htm. In einem Memo der Behörde von 2004 heißt es aber, beide Männer hätten je einen Koffer dabei gehabt: http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00038.pdf. Auch bezüglich des Inhalts der Koffer sind die Beamten sich nicht einig. Das Affidavit vom Morgen des 12. September erwähnt keinen in den Koffern enthaltenen Pass von Al-Omari, per Nachtrag von 2004 sollte er sich dann aber doch von Anfang an in Al-Omaris Koffer befunden haben.
  10. Faksimile von Attas Testament: www.abc.net.au/4corners/atta/resources/docu- ments/will1.htm
  11. Doch – ein Grund könnte einem einfallen: dass er davon ausging, mit AA 11 zu lan- den, irgendetwas zu fordern und ggf. bei der Erstürmung der entführten Maschine erschossen zu werden. In diesem Fall wäre ein Testament im Gepäckraum nicht die verkehrteste Idee gewesen, aber dann hätte Atta auch tatsächlich nur geplant, ein Flugzeug zu entführen und garantiert nicht ins World Trade Center zu rasen. Was wiederum Fragen aufwirft, die wir uns gern für die späteren Verhandlungstage auf- heben. Weshalb diese Anmerkung auch hier steht, nämlich am Rande resp. in den Anmerkungen.
  12. Seymour Hersh, »What went wrong«, in: New Yorker, 20.10.2001: »A former high- level intelligence official told me, ›Whatever trail was left was left deliberately – for the F.B.I. to chase.‹«; http://www.scribd.com/doc/16313245/T4-B8-Hersh-What-Went-Wrong-Fdr-10101-Seymour-M-Hersh-Article-1st-Pg-Scanned-for-Reference- Fair-Use-511
  13. Zugegeben, Ziad Jarrah war nicht der einzige, der sich am 11. September auch Ver- wandten gegenüber überdeutlich auswies. Wir erinnern uns an die legendären Worte des United-93-Passagiers Mark Bingham, der seine Mutter anrief und sich mit den Worten meldete: »Mom, hier ist Mark Bingham.«
  14. »In mörderischer Mission«, Focus, 19.11.2001: »Nach Focus-Informationen schickte Jarrah seiner Freundin in Bochum am Tag vor dem Anschlag ein Päckchen mit meh- reren Unterlagen über seine Flugausbildung zu.«; www.focus.de/politik/deutsch- land/ermittlung-in-moerderischer-mission_aid_192596.html
  15. »Alle werden sich freuen«, Spiegel Online, 17.11.2001: »Das Paket schickte der Libanese, der von 1996 an in Greifswald und Hamburg studierte, aus den USA nach Deutschland. Wegen einer offenbar fehlerhaften Adresse konnte es hier allerdings nicht zugestellt werden und ging zurück in die USA, wo es den Fahndern in die Hände fiel. Neben Unterlagen über Jarrahs Flugstunden fanden sie auch solche über eine bis- her nicht bekannte Tauchausbildung. Die Ermittler rätseln jetzt, ob ursprünglich an- dere Anschlagsziele geplant waren.«; www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,168260,00.html

14) Vorauswissen: Umzugshelfer

  1. 1 »The White Van. Were Israelis Detained on Sept. 11 Spies?«, ABC-News, 21.6.2002;
    http://web.archive.org/web/20021003225412/http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/DailyNews/2020_whitevan_020621.html
  2. Zit.n. Christopher Ketcham, »Cheering Movers and Art Student Spies. What Did Is- rael Know in Advance of the 9/11Attacks?«, in: Counter Punch Nr. 3/4, 2007, S. 2; http://www.christopherketcham.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/Final PDF of CounterPunch article re Israelis 01-29-07.pdf
  3. »The White Van. Were Israelis Detained on Sept. 11 Spies?«, ABC-News, 21.6.2002; http://web.archive.org/web/20021003225412/http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/DailyNews/2020_whitevan_020621.html
  4. Zit.n. Christopher Ketcham, »Cheering Movers and Art Student Spies. What Did Is- rael Know in Advance of the 9/11 Attacks?«, in: Counter Punch Nr. 3/4, 2007, S. 10; http://www.christopherketcham.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/Final PDF of CounterPunch article re Israelis 01-29-07.pdf

15) Vorauswissen: Kunststudenten

  1. Das komplette DEA-Memo hier: http://cryptome.org/dea-il-spy.htm
  2. Christopher Ketcham, »The Israeli ›art student‹ mystery«, auf Salon.com, 7.5.2002; http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/05/07/students/index.html
  3. Vgl. u.a. Glenny, McMafia
  4. Text des Shea-Memorandums hier: http://ariwatch.com/Links/SheaMemorandumIsrael/SheaMemorandumIsrael.htm

16) Vorauswissen: Insider-Händler

  1. 1 Philip Sherwell, »Bin Laden rigged oil and gold prices – bank chief«, in: The Telegraph, 23.9.2001; http://replay.web.archive.org/20011019143820/http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/09/23/woil23.xml
  2. http://911research.wtc7.net/sept11/stockputs.html
  3. Wie Bush senior war im Übrigen auch die Familie Bin Laden bei Carlyle investiert, zog ihr Investment nach 9/11 aber schicklicherweise ab. Dazu ausführlich: Brö- ckers, Verschwörungen, Verschwörungstheorien und die Geheimnisse des 11.9., S. 143 ff.; Walther, Der zensierte Tag, S. 141 ff.
  4. Michael Ruppert, »Suppressed Details of Criminal Insider Trading Lead Directly into the CIA's Highest Ranks«, auf From the Wilderness, 9.10.2001; www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/10_09_01_krongard.html
  5. David Plotz, »What You Think You Know About Sept. 11 … But Don't«, in: Slate,
    10.9.2003; www.slate.com/id/2088092/
  6. Commission memorandum »FBI Briefing on Trading«, 18.8.2003; http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00269.pdf
  7. Ebd.
  8. Die Fußnote 130 im 5. Kapitel des Commission Report, mit der der gesamte Verdacht auf Insidergeschäfte erledigt wurde, hier in Gänze: »Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9/11 generally rest on reports of unusual pre-9/11 tra- ding activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explana- tion. For example, the volume of put options- investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price-surged in the parent companies of United Airlines on September
    6 and American Airlines on September 10- highly suspicious trading on its face. Yet, further investigation has revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/11. A single U.S.-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al Qaeda purchased 95 percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious trading in American on September 10 was traced to a specific U.S.-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sun- day, September 9, which recommended these trades. These examples typify the evidence examined by the investigation. The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investiga- tors have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous. Jo- seph Cella interview (Sept. 16, 2003; May 7, 2004; May 10-11, 2004); FBI briefing (Aug. 15, 2003); SEC memo, Division of Enforcement to SEC Chair and Commissio- ners, ›Pre-September 11, 2001 Trading Review,‹ May 15, 2002; Ken Breen interview (Apr. 23, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004).«
  9. Allen M. Poteshman, »Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001«, in: The Journal of Business, 2006, Bd. 79, Nr. 4; www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/503645; Marc Chesney u.a., »Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Options Markets«, in: Social Sciences Research Network, 13.1.2010; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1522157; Wing- Keung Wong u.a., »Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?«, in: Social Sciences Research Network, 13.4.2010; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1588523
  10. Faksimile unter: http://maxkeiser.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/FOIAresponseGIF1.gif
  11. Robert Wenzel, »Confirmed: Destruction of 9-11 Options Trading Documents«, in: Economic Policy Journal, 15.6.2010; http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2010/06/destruction-of-9-11-options-trading.html

17) Die schützende Hand

  1. »15 von 19 Hijackern waren vor dem ›offiziellen‹ Einreisedatum in den USA«;
    http://www.broeckers.com/archiv/15-von-19-hijackern-waren-vor-dem-offiziellen-einreisedatum-in-usa/
  2. Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland, S. 170 ff.
  3. Peter Dale Scott, »The JFK Assassination and 9/11: the Designated Suspects in Both Cases«, auf Global Research, 5.7.2008; www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9511; Commission Report, S. 267
  4. Michael Isikoff u.a., »The Saudi Money Trail«, in: Newsweek, 2.12.2002; www.newsweek.com/2002/12/01/the-saudi-money-trail.html
  5. Hopsicker, Welcome to Terrorland; ders.: »Von Mena über Venus nach Venice. Mikro- analyse des staatlich sanktionierten Drogen- und Waffenhandels«, in: Bröckers, Die Drogenlüge; sowie Hopsickers aktuelle Berichterstattung auf www.madcowprod.com

18) Bush in Sarasota

  1. Commission Report, S. 38, Hervorhebung von uns: »The President was seated in a classroom when, at 9:05, Andrew Card whispered to him: ›A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack.‹ The President told us his instinct was to pro- ject calm, not to have the country see an excited reaction at a moment of crisis. The press was standing behind the children; he saw their phones and pagers start to ring. The President felt he should project strength and calm until he could better understand what was happening
  2. »When we walked into the classroom, I had seen this plane fly into the first buil- ding.«
    Der gesamte Wortwechsel mit einem Frager aus dem Publikum – inklusive der char- manten Scherze des Präsidenten – wird vom Weißen Haus wie folgt wiedergegeben (daher auch das oft zitierte Bush-Zitat »Anyway, it was an interesting day«):
    »›What was the first thing that went through your head when you heard that a plane crashed into the first building?‹ – ›Yes. Well, I was sitting in a schoolhouse in Florida. I had gone down to tell my little brother what to do, and – just kidding, Jeb. (Laugh- ter.) And – it's the mother in me. (Laughter.) Anyway, I was in the midst of learning about a reading program that works. I'm a big believer in basic education, and it starts with making sure every child learns to read. And therefore, we need to focus on the science of reading, not what may feel good or sound good when it comes to teaching children to read. (Applause.) I'm just getting a plug in for my reading initi- ative. – Anyway, I was sitting there, and my Chief of Staff – well, first of all, when we walked into the classroom, I had seen this plane fly into the first building. There was a TV set on. And you know, I thought it was pilot error and I was amazed that any- body could make such a terrible mistake. And something was wrong with the plane, or – anyway, I'm sitting there, listening to the briefing, and Andy Card came and said, ›America is under attack.‹ – And in the meantime, this teacher was going on about the curriculum, and I was thinking about what it meant for America to be un- der attack. It was an amazing thought. But I made up my mind that if America was under attack, we'd get them. (Applause.) I wasn't interested in lawyers, I wasn't inte- rested in a bunch of debate. I was interested in finding out who did it and bringing them to justice. I also knew that they would try to hide, and anybody who provided haven, help, food, would be held accountable by the United States of America. (Ap- plause.) – Anyway, it was an interesting day.«; http://replay.web.archive.org/20020202122249/ www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020105-3.html
  3. Bill Sammon, »Suddenly, A Time To Lead«, in: Washington Times, 7.10.2002: »The president noticed someone moving at the back of the room. It was White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, maneuvering to catch his attention without alerting the press. Mr. Fleischer was holding up a legal pad. Big block letters were scrawled on the cardboard backing: DON'T SAY ANYTHING YET.«; http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/disinfo/alibis/washingtontimes_timetolead.htm
  4. Richard Cheney in Meet The Press (NBC), 16.9.2001; http://replay.web.archive.org/20011102013616/http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html
  5. Commission Report, S. 39: »The Secret Service told us they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not think it imperative for him to run out the door.«

19) Dienst nach Vorschrift

  1. In der geänderten Vorschrift findet sich unter Punkt »c. Military Escort Aircraft« die Ausführung (Hervorhebung von uns): »When notified that military escort aircraft are needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or USELEMNORAD to deter- mine if suitable aircraft are available and forward the request to the Secretary of De- fense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7 (reference d).« Im Klartext: Kurz vor dem 11. September stellte der US-Verteidigungsminister die Regeln auf den Kopf. Erstens musste nun er persönlich angefragt werden, ob Jets überhaupt aufsteigen und die Maschine abfangen sollten, zweitens war hierzu nun seine Zustimmung erforderlich. Bis 2001 (seit 1997) war die Dienstvorschrift eben- falls eindeutig gewesen, allerdings erheblich sinnvoller, und hatte folgendermaßen gelautet: »4.7.1. Immediate Response. Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any form of immediate action taken by a DoD Component or military commander to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under immi- nently serious conditions) may be made to any Component or Command. The DoD Components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an exi- gent emergency may initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately res- pond as authorized in DoD Directive 3025.1 (reference (g)).« Wir gestatten uns zu bemerken, dass nach dem Ende der 9/11-Mission die neue Vorschrift wieder durch die alte ersetzt wurde.
  2. Die Durchsage wird Mohammed Atta zugeschrieben. Der geniale Kopf der Hijacker- Bande wusste zwar, wie man ein Flugzeug entführt und aus 40 000 Fuß Höhe über Albany genau ins WTC steuert, aber er wusste nicht, wie man mit seinen Passagieren spricht, ohne dass die ganze Welt zuhört. Ohne seinen sonderbaren Fehler hätte er rascher von Kampfjets abgefangen werden können – weil American 11 ohne Durch- sage als Maschine mit technischem Problem gegolten hätte, nicht als entführt. So blieben die Jets zunächst einmal am Boden und warteten auf eine Erlaubnis des Ver- teidigungsministers. Die nicht kam. Weil der Verteidigungsminister nicht zu spre- chen war.
  3. History Commons, »8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Hijack Coordinator Respon- sible for Contacting Military is Out of Contact«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a830faahijackcoordinator; sowie das Commission Hearing vom 23.5.2003; www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  4. Vgl. Kevin Ryan, »Why The Planes were not intercepted on 9/11: The Wall Street Lawyer and The Special Ops Hijack Coordinator«, auf 9/11 Blogger.com, 26.4.2011; http://911blogger.com/news/2011-04-26/why-planes-were-not-intercepted-911-wall-street-lawyer-and-special-ops-hijack-coordinator
  5. History Commons, »8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Di- rector Leaves Post to Attend Meeting; Does Not Resume Duties until Attacks Have Ended«; www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=Montague+win field&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go. Vgl. auch »The de- layed responses of the Pentagon Command Center on 9/11« auf Shoestring 9/11; http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2010/11/repeatedly-delayed-responses-of.html

20) Auf verlassenem Posten

  1. Laut Congressman Christopher Cox, dessen Web-Eintrag zum Thema nicht mehr auffindbar ist. 2003 war unter cox.house.gov noch zu lesen: »›And let me tell you, I've been around the block a few times. There will be another even …‹ Within minutes of that utterance, Rumsfeld's words proved tragically prophetic.« Dokumentiert ist aber alles unverändert unter History Commons, »(Before 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Rumsfeld Said to Make Eerie Predictions, but Witness Who Gives Account Is Long Gone«; www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=christopher_cox
  2. Clarkes Interview mit dem Nachrichtensender WBZ Boston; www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1884
  3. Andrew Cockburn, »Rumsfeld (First Chapter)«, in: New York Times, 25.3.2007; www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/book s/chapters/0325-1st-coc kb.html?_ r=1&pagewanted=print
  4. Ebd.
  5. Eine ausführliche Zusammenfassung und Quellensammlung liefert u.v.a. Matthew Everett, »Donald Rumsfeld on 9/11: An enemy within«, auf Online Journal Contribu- ting Writer; http://albasheer.wordpress.com/2008/06/07/donald-rumsfeld-on-911-an-enemy-within/
  6. Vgl. Clarke, Against all Enemies, S. 3
  7. Ebd., S. 5
  8. Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, S. 91
  9. Vgl. die exzellente Zusammenfassung auf Shoestring 9/11, 18.6.2010: »The Actions and Inactions of the Commander in Charge of the U.S. Air Defense Failure on 9/11«; http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2010_06_01_archive.html
  10. »Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief
    NORAD), General Edward ›Ed‹ Eberhart; http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00788.pdf
  11. Ebd.
  12. Vgl. 9/11 Commission Report, S. 42, sowie Spencer, Touching History, S. 240
  13. Bruce Finley, »Military to put Cheyenne Mountain on standby«, in: Denver Post, 27.7.2006; www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_4103478
  14. »for 109 minutes … this country and its citizens were completely undefended«: Sen. Mark Dayton vor dem Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 30.7.2004;
    www.wethepeoplewethemedia.com/dayton.htm
  15. Vgl. dazu u.a. auf Woody Box: »The Four Lies of Norman Mineta«;http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/04/four-lies-of-norman-mineta.html
  16. www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20050724164122860
  17. Clarke, Against all Enemies, S. 8 f.
  18. Aidan Monaghan, »Secret Service: No Records of Cheney's Arrival in the Bunker on
    9/11«, 7.5.2005 (Dokumentation der entsprechenden FOIA-Anfrage);
    www.911truth.org/article.php?story=2008050770616110
  19. Commission Report, S. 41
  20. Ebd. Dick Cheney im Interview mit Tim Russert, Meet the Press, MSNBC, 16.9.2001; http://replay.web.archive.org/20011102013616/http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html

21) Intermezzo: Schwundgeld

  1. »DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff – Bureaucracy to Battlefield. Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld«, Penta- gon-Pressemitteilung vom 10.9.2001: »The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the security of the United States of America. This ad- versary is one of the world's last bastions of central planning. It governs by dictating five-year plans. From a single capital, it attempts to impose its demands across time zones, continents, oceans and beyond. With brutal consistency, it stifles free thought and crushes new ideas. It disrupts the defense of the United States and places the lives of men and women in uniform at risk.«; www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=430
  2. Ebd.: »The adversary's closer to home. It's the Pentagon bureaucracy.«
  3. Ebd.: »According to some estimates, we cannot track $ 2.3 trillion in transactions.«
  4. »Opportunities for Oversight and Improved Use of Taxpayer Funds: Examples from Selected GAO Work«, GAO-Report GAO-03-1006, 1.8.2003: »Over the past thirty ye- ars, analyses by the nonpartisan congressional General Accounting Office show that about one third of the US military budget is simply unaccounted for. This astounding fact amounts to a senseless loss of trillions of dollars to American taxpayers, mainly benefitting corrupt defense contractors and their cronies in the rest of the military- industrial complex.«; www.gao.gov/atext/d031006.txt
  5. Julian Borger u.a.: »So Much For the Peace Dividend: Pentagon is Winning the Battle For a $ 400 Billion Budget«, in: Guardian, 22.5.2003: »The Pentagon's own inspector general recently admitted that the department could not account for more than a trillion dollars of past spending. A congressional investigation reported that inventory management in the army was so weak it had lost track of 56 airplanes, 32 tanks, and 36 missile launchers.«; www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/may/22/usa.davidteather. Vgl. auch »Pentagon Fights For (Its) Freedom«, CBSNews, 19.5.2003; www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/19/national/main554514.shtml; sowie Tom Abate, »Military Waste Under Fire – $ 1 Trillion Missing«, in: San Francisco Chronicle,
    18.5.2003; http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-05-18/news/17491492_1_pentagon-gao-financial-accounting
  6. Fitzgerald, The Pentagonists
  7. Matt Kelley: »Pentagon paid $ 409 each for $ 39 sinks, investigators find«, Associa- ted Press, 23.3.2001; vgl. »Audit: Pentagon paid $ 76 for 57-cent screw; Military of- ficial calls overpayments ›rare‹«, CNN, 18.3.1998; http://edition.cnn.com/US/9803/18/pentagon.76.screw/
  8. Zit.n. Vince Gonzales, »The War on Waste«, CBS News, 29.1.2002: »With good finan- cial oversight we could find $ 48 billion in loose change in that building, without having to hit the taxpayers.«; www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/29/evening-news/main325985.shtml
  9. Zit.n. ebd.: »We need to save it (the Pentagon) from itself.«
  10. Julian Borger u.a.: »So Much For the Peace Dividend: Pentagon is Winning the Battle For a $ 400 Billion Budget«, in: Guardian, 22.5.2003: »For instance, in June 2002 the GAO reviewed the history of a proposed Corporate Information Manage- ment system, or CIM. The initiative began in 1989 as an attempt to unify more than 2000 overlapping systems then being used for billing, inventory, personnel and simi- lar functions. But after ›spending about $20 billion, the CIM initiative was eventu- ally abandoned‹, the GAO said.«; www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/may/22/usa.davidteather
  11. Youtube liefert die entsprechenden zehn Minuten mit Cynthia McKinney, demokra- tische Abgeordnete aus Georgia, aus einer Budget-Anhörung 2006, die von C-Span ebenso pflichtschuldig wie folgenlos übertragen wurde: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Px1t1-a9uxk&NR=1
  12. »US ›fails to account‹ for Iraq reconstruction billions«, BBC, 27.7.2010: »Billions have gone to rebuild Iraq but much of the money is impossible to trace, says a US audit. A US federal watchdog has criticised the US military for failing to account properly for billions of dollars it received to help rebuild Iraq. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction says the US Department of Defence is unable to account pro- perly for 96% of the money. Out of just over $9bn (£5.8bn), $8.7bn is unaccounted for, the inspector says.«; www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10774002
  13. Vgl. Penn Bullock u.a., »Audit: Pentagon overpaid billionaire oilman by up to $200 billion«, in: Washington Post, 17.3.2011; www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pentagon-overpaid-oilman-millions-audit-finds/2011/03/17/ABQ6VFn_story.html
  14. Vgl. Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2010, 11.4.2011; www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ factsheet2010
  15. Chris Hellmann, »The Real U.S. National Security Budget. The Figure No One Wants You to See«, auf Tomdispatch, 1.3.2011;
    www.tomdispatch.com/post/175361/tomgram%3A_chris_hellman,_$1.2_trillion_for_national_security/

22) Manöver jenseits der Vorstellungskraft

  1. Im Commission Report, S. 346, heißt es hierzu: »We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management«, womit man die Einschätzung des damaligen stellvertretenden Verteidigungsminis- ters Paul Wolfowitz fast wörtlich teilte: He »wondered why so little thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a ›failure of imagination‹ and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities« (S. 338). Sollte überhaupt jemand mit einem Terroranschlag mittels entführter Flugzeuge gerechnet haben, dann immer mit ei- nem Anschlag aus »Übersee«: »the military planners assumed that since such air- craft would be coming from overseas; they would have time to identify the target and scramble interceptors.«
  2. Walther, Der zensierte Tag, S. 91 ff.
  3. Clarke, Against all Enemies, S. 106 ff. Der »Counter-Terrorism-Zar« zitiert sich hier im Hinblick auf die US-Vorbereitungen auf die Olympischen Spiele 1996 in Los Angeles selbst: »Was, wenn jemand eine 747 über dem Olympiastadion hochjagt, oder sogar eine ins Stadion hineinfliegt?«
  4. Commission Report, S. 458: »On 9/11, NORAD was scheduled to conduct a military exercise, Vigilant Guardian, which postulated a bomber attack from the former So- viet Union. We investigated whether military preparations for the large-scale exer- cise compromised the military's response to the real-world terrorist attack on 9/11. According to General Eberhart, ›it took about 30 seconds‹ to make the adjustment to the real-world situation. (Ralph Eberhart testimony, June 17, 2004.) We found that the response was, if anything, expedited by the increased number of staff at the sec- tors and at NORAD because of the scheduled exercise. See Robert Marr interview (Jan. 23, 2004).«
  5. History Commons, »July 2001 – NORAD Plans a Mock Simultaneous Hijacking Th- reat From Inside the US«, nach den Quellen CNN, AFPS, AP, Commission Report und USA Today: »NORAD is already planning for the Amalgam Virgo 02 exercise. This exercise, scheduled for June 2002, will involve the simulation of two simultaneous commercial aircraft hijackings. One plane, a Delta 757, flown by Delta pilots, will fly from Salt Lake City, Utah to Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska. It will be ›hijacked‹ by FBI agents posing as terrorists. The other plane will be a Navy C-9 bound from Oak Harbor, Washington to Vancouver, British Columbia, and will be ›hijacked‹ by Royal Canadian Mounted Police. On both planes, military personnel will act as civilian passengers. US and Canadian fighters are to respond, and either force the planes to land or simulate shooting them down. Describing Amalgam Virgo 02 to the 9/11 Commission, NORAD's Major General Craig McKinley later says, ›Th- reats of killing hostages or crashing were left to the script writers to invoke creativity and broaden the required response for players.‹ About 1,500 people will participate in the exercise. USA Today will note that this is an exception to NORAD's claim that, prior to 9/11, it focused only on external threats to the US and did not consider the possibility of threats arising from within the US. 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben- Veniste will similarly comment that this planned exercise shows that, despite fre- quent comments to the contrary, the military considered simultaneous hijackings before 9/11.«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore091101virgo2#abefore091101virgo2
  6. Commission Hearing vom 23.5.2003; www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  7. Vgl. History Commons, »October 24-26, 2000: Military Holds Exercise Rehearsing Response to a Plane Crash at the Pentagon«, in Zusammenfassung mehrerer Quel- len: »Pentagon and Arlington County emergency responders assemble in the Office of the Secretary of Defense conference room in the Pentagon for a mass casualty exercise (›MASCAL‹). The exercise involves several mock-scenarios. One is of a com- mercial airliner crashing into the Pentagon and killing 341 people, while two others are a terrorist attack at the Pentagon's subway stop and a construction accident. The plane crash exercise is conducted using a large-scale model of the Pentagon with a model airplane literally on fire in the central courtyard of the building. An Army medic who participates calls it ›a real good scenario and one that could happen ea- sily,‹ while a fire chief notes: ›You have to plan for this. Look at all the air traffic around here.‹«;
    www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=complete_911_timeline_102400mascal#complete_911_timeline_102400mascal
  8. MTI Report S-01-02, National Transportation Security Summit, 30.10.2001; http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/research/publications/documents/terrorism/Terrorism%20Symposium%202001.htm
  9. Eine umfangreichere Übersicht auch über die kleineren Übungen findet sich z.B. un- ter http://911research.wtc7.net/planes/defense/wargames.html. Betreffend die mit Global Guardian verschränkten Übungen Crown Vigilance und Apollo Guardian helfen die Links der History Commons weiter; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a830globalguardian#a830globalguardian
  10. Vgl. u.a. Filson, Air War Over America, S. 122, sowie Michael Bronner, »9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes«, in: Vanity Fair, August 2006; www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/08/norad200608?printable=true¤tPage=all
  11. NORAD-Sprecher Colonel Scott sagte im Commission Hearing vom 23.5.2003 aus: »Und es gab Meldungen über weitere Maschinen, während wir anfingen, andere Flugzeuge umzuleiten, die an diesem Tag nur zu Übungszwecken draußen waren.« (»And there are notations here about other airplanes as we begin to divert other airplanes that are just out were intended for training that day.«); www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  12. Die FAA (Boston Center) setzte sich mehr oder weniger rechtzeitig am Morgen des 11.9.2001 mit dem Militär in Verbindung, genauer: mit dem North Eastern Defense Sector (NEADS). Der übermittelte Dialog lautete: »We need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out.« – »Is this real world or an exercise?« – »No, this is not an exercise. Not a test.«
  13. Im Rahmen der NRO-Übung sollte um 9:37 Uhr der erste Löschzug des Fairfax Fire Department anrücken. Sollte dies »real« geplant gewesen sein (und nicht nur »auf Papier«), wären die Feuerwehrleute jedenfalls zum tatsächlichen Pentagon-Crash- Zeitpunkt bereits »in Hut und Mantel« gewesen. Details sind leider weiterhin nicht bekannt, denn das NRO gilt zu Recht als äußerst zurückhaltende Behörde; http://hcg roups.wordpress.com/2009/09/07/911-training-exercise-planned-for-simulated-plane-crash-five-minutes-before-pentagon-attack-took-place/
  14. Pamela Hess, »U.S. Agency's Strange 9/11 Coincidence«, UPI, 22.8.2002; www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/08/22/US-agencys-strange-9ll-coincidence/UPI-70461030045607/
  15. Die Hinterbliebenen der 9/11-Opfer, angeführt von vier tapferen Witwen, den »Jer- sey Girls«, verlangten selbstredend die Herausgabe der Überwachungsbilder, denn diese sollten zeigen, was in Washington geschah. Das NRO kam der Bitte nicht nach – angeblich, weil zum fraglichen Zeitpunkt (wegen der Übung) kein Satellit das Pen- tagon im elektronischen Auge gehabt hatte.
  16. Staff Sgt. Mark Williams of the Military District of Washington Engineer Company at Fort Belvoir, Connection Newspapers, 5.9.2002: »›Ironically, we were conducting classes about rescue techniques when we were told of the planes hitting the World Trade Center.‹ Williams' team is one of the first response groups to arrive at the site of the Pentagon crash and one of the first to enter the building following the at- tack.«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a830fortbelvoir#a830fortbelvoir
  17. Vgl. History Commons, »8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001: Office of Emergency Ma- nagement Preparing for Bioterrorism Exercise; Opens Its Command Center«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a848commandcenter#a848commandcenter

23) Das Militär: zu spät informiert

  1. Commission Report, S. 20: »Military Notification and Response. Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the ini- tiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The cen- ter also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notifica- tion received by the military—at any level—that American 11 had been hijacked. … NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call. … F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base, but NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed for more information: ›I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination.‹ Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return. American 11 struck the North Tower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. … Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. … From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.«
    S. 21: »That nine minutes' notice before impact was the most the military would re- ceive of any of the four hijackings.«
    S. 23: »Military Notification and Response. The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03. The notice came at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower.«
    S. 24: »Radar data show that at 9:13, when the Otis fighters were about 115 miles away from the city, the fighters exited their holding pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan. They arrived at 9:25 and established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city. … The Langley fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09. NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked.»
    S. 26: »Military Notification and Response. NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed: American 11.«
    S. 27: »Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjus- ted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported south- bound American 11 and the nation's capital. … The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing … No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77. … 9:36: He [Kevin Nasypany] then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north to- ward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. … After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C.« S. 28: »NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989.«
    S. 30: »Military Notification and Response. NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft's last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground.«
    S. 31: »The time of notification of the crash of United 93 was 10:15. The NEADS air defenders never located the flight or followed it on their radar scopes. The flight had already crashed by the time they learned it was hijacked.«
    S. 45: »NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted and shot down United 93. We are not so sure.« Zusammenfassend (inklusive aller überraschenden und nicht näher erklärten Kor- rekturen der früheren »Response Timelines« des Militärs):
    S. 34: »In public testi- mony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77, United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contem- poraneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records. Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense. The inaccurate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft. In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken information about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked. It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost. Then, minutes later, NEADS was told that an unknown plane was 6 miles southwest of the White House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving di- rectly toward Washington, D.C. Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to res- pond to American 77, as testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washing- ton, and the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help. They had been res- ponding to a report about an aircraft that did not exist. Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be implied by the account that it received notice of the flight's hijacking at 9:16. By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed.«
  2. Ebd., S. 4, sowie Fußnote 24, S. 452
  3. Vgl. History Commons, »9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Informs NEADS of Possible Hijacking of Delta 1989«: www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=1989+intercept&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&to pics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go
  4. E-Mail von Colin Scoggins an uns, September 2006: »(about 8:36) I called NEADs just to verify that they had the target of AAL 11. I was surprised that they hadn't got that yet. The aircraft was about 20 NM south of ALB at the time. … I called Otis a minute or two later and asked of the fighters status, they told me they were ready to go but were waiting for orders. I called NEADs back and gave them a new position 50 NM south of ALB, this time I gave them a L/L and they still couldn't find the tar- get. … and there is no way you couldn't see an untracked target traveling at 600 knots … I still don't know how they never saw the aircraft. Frustrating would be an understatement.«
  5. Spencer, Touching History, S. 40 f.
  6. Am 25. Oktober 1999 antwortete der Privatjet des Golfers Payne Stewart um 9:33 Uhr nicht auf eine Funkanfrage der Luftraumüberwachung. Nachdem der zustän- dige Lotse viereinhalb Minuten lang vergeblich versucht hatte, den Kontakt zu der ohne Funk auf falschem Kurs fliegenden Maschine wiederherzustellen, alarmierten seine Vorgesetzten weisungsgemäß NORAD, respektive die Air Force. Dem in 46 000 Fuß Höhe fliegenden Jet, in dem die Crew durch einen plötzlichen Druckverlust kol- labiert war, stand 16 Minuten später, um 9:52 Uhr, ein F-16-Jäger abschussbereit Tragfläche an Tragfläche zur Seite. Der Learjet stürzte schließlich führerlos ab.
    Ergo, so die Skeptiker der offiziellen Version, hätten die US-Abfangjäger auch zwei Jahre später sehr wohl in der Lage sein müssen, binnen 16 Minuten unter den Trag- flächen jedes verdächtigen Fliegers zu kleben. Sofern man ihnen den Start nicht untersagte. Ungern erwähnen sie indes, dass a) der Transponder des Privatjets einge- schaltet war, also die Maschine erheblich leichter zu lokalisieren war als die 9/11-Ziele, b) die F-16, die den toten Golfer abfing, bereits in der Luft gewesen war (wegen einer Übung) und c) das Ziel von Ost nach West flog, von Orlando nach Dal- las, und zwischen dem Ende der Verbindung um 9:33 Uhr und dem Abfangen um 9:52 eine Zeitgrenze überflog, also aus der Zeitzone »Eastern-Daylight-Time« in die Zeitzone »Central-Daylight-Time« (– 1 h). Demnach erschien der Abfangjäger nicht 16 Minuten nach dem Ende der Funkverbindung an der Seite des Jets, sondern erst nach einer Stunde und 16 Minuten. Was die Argumentation der Skeptiker zwar nicht vom Tisch wischt, aber doch, zumindest in diesem Punkt, geringfügig relativiert.
  7. CBS News, 23.2.2002, »Speed Likely Factor In WTC Collapse«; www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/25/attack/main501989.shtml
  8. Hanns Rosin u.a., »At Logan Airport, Nobody Saw Plane's Sharp Turn South«, in: Washington Post, 12.9.2001: »Boston airport officials said they did not spot the plane's course change until it had crashed, and said the control tower had no unu- sual communication with the pilots or any crew members.«; www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2001/09/12/AR2005033108361.html
  9. Aussage von NORAD-Sprecher Colonel Alan Scott vor der 9/11-Commission, Hea- ring vom 23.5.2003, S. 19: »Um 8.46 Uhr, das ist der nächste aufgezeichnete Vorfall, kriegen wir die letzten Radardaten; wobei übrigens viele der Radardaten für diese Primärziele [die Flugzeuge] waren an jenem Tag nicht zu sehen. Sie wurden Tage später vom 84. Radarauswertungsgeschwader und anderen, vergleichbaren Dienst- stellen ausgewertet, Fachleuten in Sachen retrospektiver Auswertung von Radarauf- zeichnungen, die aus dem vorhandenen Material im Wissen um die tatsächlichen Vorfälle im Nachhinein Dinge herausfiltern konnten, die während des Vorfalls selbst vielleicht gar nicht zu erkennen waren.«; www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  10. Scott, ebd.: »United 175, the second airplane, which by the way never turned off its transponder before impact, crashes into the North Tower (sic!) at 9:02.« Dass er sich hier mit Nord- und Südturm vertan hat – geschenkt.
  11. Charles Lane, »A Sky Filled With Chaos, Uncertainty and True Heroism«, in: Wa- shington Post, 17.9.2001: »As several controllers gathered to help search for the American plane, a controller glanced at another radar screen and shouted, ›Look. There's an intruder over Allentown‹. In air traffic jargon, an ›intruder‹ is a plane with an operating transponder that has entered restricted airspace without permission.« (Artikel nicht mehr online!)
  12. Zit.n. der Umschrift der Fluglotsenkommunikation, veröffentlicht von der New York Times, 16.10.2001 (»R42« und »R10« sind die kommunizierenden Lotsen): »8:53:23 (R42): 10 – do you see that UAL175 anywhere and do me a favor, you see that target there on 3321 code at 335 climbing, don't know who he is but you got that USA 583 if you need to descent him down you can nobody we may have a hijack we have some problem over here right now 8:53:35 (R10): Oh, you do 8:53:37 (R42): Yes, that may be real traffic, nobody knows I can't get a hold of UAL175 at all right now, and I don't know where he went to.«; www.nytimes.com/2001/10/16/national/16FLIGHT175-TEXT.html?ex=1064376000&en=d1512361dcf74875&ei=5070
  13. Zit.n. Spencer, Touching History, S. 84
  14. NORAD-General Arnold, 9/11-Comission, Hearing vom 23.5.2003, S. 34: »We had no warning of that whatsoever. In fact, that airplane was called possibly hijacked later on, which as General McKinley referred to, as the fog and friction of war, actu- ally caused further confusion, because we were not aware which aircraft actually crashed into the towers. We just knew that by now we had two airplanes that have crashed into the owers. We have two airplanes that are called hijacked.«; www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  15. Vgl. die Website Pilots for 9/11 Truth Forum: »NASA Flight Director Confirms 9/11 Aircraft Speed As The ›Elephant In The Room‹«; http://pilotsfor911truth.org/ forum/index.php?showtopic=20178; ferner History Commons, »October 2002– October 2005: NIST Tries to Estimate Speed of Aircraft Impacting WTC»; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1002speedindispute#a1002speedindispute
  16. Siehe: www.scribd.com/doc/40513256/Radar-Maps-AA-77-C-130-UA-93-and-Air- Force-One
  17. NORAD-General Arnold, 9/11-Comission, Hearing vom 23.5.2003, S. 35: »And I can tell you that I did not know, and I don't believe anybody in the NORAD system, knew where that airplane was.«; www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  18. NORAD-Sprecher Colonel Scott, 9/11-Commission, Hearing 2/2, 23.5.2003, S. 21: »9.27, Boston FAA reports fifth aircraft missing, Delta Flight 89 – and many people have never heard of Delta Flight 89. We call that the first red herring of the day, be- cause there were a number of reported possible hijackings that unfolded over the hours immediately following the actual attacks.«;
    www.9-11commission.gov/ archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  19. Ebd.: »And 9.40, immediately following that, is when 93 up north turns its transpon- ders off out in the West toward Ohio, and begins a left turn back toward the East. At 9.49, FAA reports that Delta 89, which had been reported as missing, is now repor- ted as a possible hijacking. So again he is – MR. ???: That's 9.41, sir. – MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, 9:41. Again, he is in the system. He is kind of a red herring for us.«
  20. Vgl. »The Many False Hijackings of 9/11« auf Shoestring, 10.4.2011; http://shoestring911.blogspot.com/2011/04/many-false-hijackings-of-911.html
  21. Marilyn Adams, Alan Levon und Blake Morrison, »No One Was Sure Hijackers were on Board«, in: USA Today, 12.8.2002: »At the Federal Aviation Administration's command center in Herndon, Va., Delta Flight 1989 joins a growing list of suspicious jets. Some of their flight numbers will be scrawled on a white dry-erase board throughout the morning. Eventually, the list will grow to 11. – One, a TWA flight, refuses to land in Pittsburgh and wants to fly on toward Washington. Another, a Mid- west Express flight, disappears from radar over West Virginia.«;
    www.usatoday. com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-hijacker-daytwo_x.htm
  22. Colonel Scott, 9/11-Commission, Hearing vom 23.5.2003, S. 22: »At 10.07 FAA re- ports there may be a bomb on board 93 – that's four minutes after the impact. At 10.15 they report that it's crashed. And you can see now that fog and friction lag time has increased from seven minutes to nine minutes to 15 minutes, because of the level of activities that are going on. And there are notations here about other airplanes as we begin to divert other airplanes that are just out were intended for training that day.«; www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  23. Vgl. William B. Scott, »Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks«, in: Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3.6.2002: »Sgt. Jeremy W. Powell of North American Aero- space Defense Command's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, N.Y., took the first call from Boston Center. He notified NEADS commander Col. Robert K. Marr, Jr., of a possible hijacked airliner, American Airlines Flight 11. – ›Part of the exercise?‹ the colonel wondered. No; this is a real-world event, he was told.«; http://s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2002/aviationweekspacetechnology060302.html
  24. NEADS Audio File, Mission Crew Commander Position, Channel 2. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; www.scribd.com/doc/14142047/NYC-Box-3-Neadsconrnorad-Fdr-Transcript-Neads-Channel-2-Mcc-Upside-006; Transcripts From Voice Recorder, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, NY. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; www.scribd.com/doc/14142009/NYC-Box-2-NEADS-Transcr ipt-Rome-NY-Fdr-Transcr ipt-Pgs-182-12371417
  25. NEADS Audio File, Senior Director Position, Channel 20. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001;
    www.scribd.com/doc/14142101/NYC-Box-3-Neadsconrnorad-Fdr-Transcript-Neads-Channel-20-502-Tk-009
  26. »If this is an exercise input, it is a good one.«: Eine wie üblich enorm umfangreiche Übersicht über die zahlreichen »Insert«-Quellen bietet History Commons, z.B. unter »9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Surveillance Technicians Instructed to Re- move Simulated Information from Radar Screens«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a934simswitches
  27. Sally Donnelly, »The Day the FAA Stopped the World«, in: Time Magazine, 14.9.2001: »Confusion reached such a high level that the FAA admitted to the White House of- ficials who wanted to bring the President back to Washington that the agency could not account for seven planes. In fact, four of those planes turned out to be the dow- ned ones – but that would take a while to sort out. Even more worrying was that it took the FAA another hour and a half to account for three other aircraft.«; www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,174912,00.html

24) Das Gespenst: Phantomflug AA 11

  1. 1 Commission Report, S. 26: »We have not been able to identify the source of this information.«
  2. Eine gründliche Dokumentation von Scoggins' Meldungen am 11.9. findet sich in den History Commons unter
    www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=scoggins&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go
  3. Commission Report, S.26: »At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA:
    FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards – heading towards Washington
    NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air? FAA: Yes
    NEADS: On its way towards Washington?
    FAA: That was another – it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have
    NEADS: Okay
    FAA: I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south
    NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right
    FAA: No, he is a hijack
    NEADS: He – American 11 is a hijack? FAA: Yes
    NEADS: And he's heading into Washington? FAA: Yes. This could be a the third aircraft«
    Ergänzend hier die Aussage von Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, zit.n. »9/11. Interviews by Peter Jennings«, ABC News 11.9.2002: »They told us that they showed the Ameri- can Airlines Flight 11 was still airborne. So now, we're looking at this, well if, if an aircraft hit the World Trade Center, who was that?« Die vollständige Transkription des TV-Beitrages findet sich unter http://911myths.com/index.php/ABC_News_9-11-2002
  4. E-Mail von Colin Scoggins an uns, August 2006: »Someone on the telcon said that AAL 11 was still in the air. Not exactly who or why, and I don't even know who was on that telcon, the following I am sure of, The Command Center someone from Wa- shington National Tower, possibly Dulles Tower, I don't think other agencies were on that early.«
  5. Die »Irrtümer« wegen dieses Phantomflugs sind umfassend. Vgl. Commission Report, S. 27 f., Hervorhebungen von uns: »In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This state- ment was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77, Uni- ted 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south. … Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense. The inaccurate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft. In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken information about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked. … the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help. They had been responding to a report about an aircraft that did not exist.«
  6. Die Wortmeldung von Colin Scoggins (alias Cheapshot) auf Break for News, 25.8.2006 (Hervorhebungen von uns): »First the fact that there was a call about phantom flight 11 is for real, and not fake, and it does exist. I made that call. … I had made probably 40 phone calls to NEADS over the course of that morning. The calls I made that morning the majority of them were made on the DSN phone system. Bos- ton Center does not record the DSN phone system but NEADS does. The justice de- partment was under the impression that my interview would take about 5 minutes, due to the fact that only three of my calls were on the hotline to NEADS from Boston Center … these (NORAD) tapes had my calls that AAL 11 was still airborne, and my calls about AAL 77, 6 miles southwest of the whitehouse. So again I reiterate that the tapes are real, the person who made those calls is for real, for it is I who made them.«; www.breakfornews.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=493
  7. Aus denen wir im Folgenden zitieren, soweit Colin Scoggins seine Aussagen auch anderswo öffentlich unterstrichen hat. Die genaueren Zusammenhänge, Vermutun- gen und Namen müssen wir uns allerdings für die Hauptverhandlung aufheben, denn Scoggins hat uns nicht gestattet, ihn diesbezüglich öffentlich zu zitieren.
  8. E-Mail von Colin Scoggins an uns, September 2006: »… two years later, General Ar- nold and Colonel Marr are left guessing why they launched the fighters from Lang- ley, they are left with it must have been AAL 77, because it was the only thing that made sense, they didn't have any tapes stating that I had called them.«
  9. History Commons, »September 11, 2001: Boston Center Military Liaison Makes His First Call to NEADS, Though 9/11 Commission Does Not Mention It«: »(Scoggins) deserves a lot of credit because he was about the only one that was feeding us infor- mation. I don't know exactly where he got it. But he was feeding us information as much as he could.«, www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a835scogginscall s#a835scogginscalls
  10. E-Mail von Colin Scoggins an uns, September 2006: »All's I did was report that there was a target near the Whitehouse from a conversation on one of the Telcons we were listening to …This was basically the response from Washington Center: ›How does Boston Center know of any target near the White House‹ and they hung up on NEADS.«
  11. Wir geben Scoggins' E-Mail-Wortlaut nicht wieder, aber es kam »erwürgen« drin vor und auch das Wort »Arschlöcher«.
  12. Vgl. History-Commons, »(10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center Controller
    Notices Unidentified Aircraft Approaching from East« (Hervorhebungen von uns): »Scoggins says: ›We have a large, slow-moving target approaching Cape Cod and heading for Boston. Do you have it? What is it?‹ The person at Giant Killer only re- plies, ›We're looking,‹ and then mentions, ›We've got a fleet of ships heading toward the northeast and an Aegis cruiser [a high-tech warship] on the way.‹ Scoggins is worried that Giant Killer is unable to specifically identify the target he is seeing on his radar screen. It appears to be flying straight toward the Boston Center. He thinks to himself, ›If I wanted to use airliners to attack a country, I would take out their air traffic control facilities!‹ Scoggins continues watching the suspicious aircraft on his radar screen. Shortly afterward, the Boston Center will be evacuated after the FAA's New England regional office calls it and reports an unidentified aircraft heading to- ward the facility.«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1020slowtarget#a1020slowtarget
  13. Vgl. Spencer, Touching History, S. 242 f.
  14. Break for News, 25.8.2006: »They can add ghost targets to their simulations. I believe they can mix with live traffic, when we do simulations at the center for our FAA tra- nining …«; www.breakfornews.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=493
    In den Vorschriften der Übung Vigilant Guardian für den 11. September wurden die militärischen Teilnehmer allerdings darauf hingewiesen, sie sollten auf ihren eige- nen Schirmen den »Q-93«-Schalter auf »mixed« stellen, um echte und simulierte Radarsignale auseinanderhalten zu können. Wörtlich heißt es in den Memo SPE- CIAL INSTRUCTIONS (SPINS) VIGILANT GUARDIAN 01-2, Department of the Air Force vom 23.8.2001: »Q 93 CONFIGURATION: The exercise will be conducted Sim over Live on the Air Sovereignty string. The Q-93 must be placed in the Mixed Mode to allow the Telling of Sim tracks.« Ob diese Q-93-Mischung auch auf den Bostoner Schirmen wie gewünscht ankam – darüber können wir nur mutmaßen.
  15. Der Roman zu diesem Verschwörungsszenario ist Cooper, Das fünfte Flugzeug.

25) American 11: Augenzeugen an Bord

  1. Betty Ong, aufgezeichnetes Telefonat mit Lydia Gonzalez, 9/11-Commission, Hearing vom 27.4.2004, S. 110, Hervorhebung von uns: »Our number 1 is stabbed right now. And who else is … And our number 5 – our first class passenger are – galley flight attendant and our purser has been stabbed. And we can't get into the cockpit, the door won't open. Hello?«;
    www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing7/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-01-27.htm
    Ong fragte ihre Kollegen im Verlauf des aufgezeichneten Gesprächs in diesen ersten Minuten der Entführung ein weiteres Mal: »Can anybody get up to the cockpit?« Aus der First Class erhielt sie offenkundig die Rückmeldung: »Nein« – was sie erneut an Gonzalez weitergab.
  2. Zeugin Lydia Gonzales, Ongs telefonische Gesprächspartnerin; 9/11-Commission, Commission Hearing vom 27.4.2004, S. 108: »Although she wasn't able to give us the description of the attackers, she told us the seat locations of these individuals.« Wobei Gonzalez' »these individuals« sich ausdrücklich auf zwei Männer bezieht, nicht auf fünf.
  3. Commission Report, S. 6: »At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was ›flying errati- cally‹.«
  4. Commission Report, S. 6 f.: »At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward, ›Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent … we are all over the place.‹ Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney res- ponded: ›We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way too low.‹ Seconds later she said, ›Oh my God we are way too low.‹ The phone call ended.«

26) United 93: zu früh, zu spät

  1. Robert C. Pollack, »Riding shotgun in the sky«, in: The Record-Journal, Connecticut, 25.2.2004: »›Continental Airlines First Officer James‹ LaRosa described how he wai- ted on a Newark Airport runway aboard a 737 preparing for a flight to Costa Rica and was just two planes behind United Airlines Flight 93, the last plane to be hija- cked on that gut-wrenching day. … ›It could just as easily have been me and my flight,‹ said LaRosa, who has logged about 7,500 hours as a commercial pilot. His own flight took off at 7:35* a.m. [* Read: 8:35. The article was published in Connec- ticut, so you have to add an hour to be back at Eastern Daylight Time] but was soon diverted to the nearest airport qualified for international flights — customs had to be available — which turned out to be in Raleigh-Durham in North Carolina. But he and the passengers knew nothing about what had happened until after they lan- ded.«; http://replay.web.archive.org/20040225133304/http://www.record-journal.com/articles/2004/02/16/news/news01.txt
  2. NORAD-Sprecher Colonel Scott, 9/11-Commission, Hearing vom 23.5.2003, S. 21: »9.16, now FAA reports a possible hijack of United Flight 93, which is out in the Ohio area.«; www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
  3. Jeff Pillets, »In Rural Hamlet, The Mystery Mounts; 5 Report Second Plane at PA. Crash Site«, in: The Bergen Record (NJ), 14.9.2001: »(He) said he began searching the horizon for any signs of the 757 around 9:20 a.m, when the Cleveland Control Center radioed that Flight 93 was headed in their direction and was apparently out of control.«; www.flight93crash.com/second-plane-at-flight93-crash-site.htm
  4. Clarke, Against All Enemies, S. 7
  5. Commission Report, S. 34: »In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA.175 This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.«
  6. Commission Report, S. 11
  7. History Commons, »9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Makes Last Contact with Air Traffic Control«: » At 9:27, the Cleveland controller, John Werth, alerts it to another aircraft 12 miles away and to its right, at 37,000 feet: ›United 93, that traffic for you is one o'clock, 12 miles east, bound three-seven-zero.‹ Seconds later, Flight 93 responds, ›Negative contact, we're looking, United 93.‹ Less than a minute after this, the hijackers appear to enter Flight 93's cockpit.«; www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=john_werth_1
  8. Commission Report, S. 11: »The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio (sic!), United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring ›Mayday‹ amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. The captain or first officer could be heard shouting: ›Hey get out of here – get out of here – get out of here.‹«
    Hervorhebung von uns. Sowie die Anmerkung, dass hier etwas aus der wahren Ori- ginal-Timeline erhalten geblieben ist, nämlich »United 93 über Ohio«, nicht über Pennsylvania.
  9. Wir wollen nicht verschweigen, aber aus Gründen der Restverständlichkeit auf Pro- zesstag 26 vertagen, dass selbst hinsichtlich der Identität von Delta 1989 etliche Fra- gen bleiben. Wer vorgreifen und nachvollziehen möchte, weshalb es nach Ansicht von akribischen Skeptikern auch diesen Flug doppelt gab, findet unter »Delta 89, Code 7112: The Faker Hijack Exercise«, beigesteuert von WoodyBox, gute Anhalts- punkte; http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009/06/delta-89-code-7112-faker- hijack.html
  10. Commission Report, S. 31: »The time of notification of the crash of United 93 was 10:15. The NEADS air defenders never located the flight or followed it on their radar scopes. The flight had already crashed by the time they learned it was hijacked.« Und ebd., S. 34: »By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed.«

27) United 93: kein Abschuss

  1. Eine ausführliche Zusammenstellung der Zeugenaussagen bietet John Doe II, »… and kiss the official UA 93 Story good-bye!«, auf Democratic Underground;
    www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=125x28985
  2. www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6Xoxaf1Al0
  3. Siehe: www.scribd.com/doc/40513256/Radar-Maps-AA-77-C-130-UA-93-and-Air- Force-One
  4. John Doe II, »… and kiss the official UA 93 Story good-bye!«, auf Democratic Under- ground; www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=125x28985
    Siehe auch Debra Erdley, »Crash debris found 8 miles away«, in: Tribune Review (Pittsburgh), 14.9.2001: »John Fleegle, marina owner Jim Brant and two of Brant's employees were among the dozens who witnessed the crash from Indian Lake. …
    ›All of a sudden the lights flickered and we joked that maybe they were coming for us. Then we heard engines screaming close overhead. The building shook. We ran out, heard the explosion and saw a fireball mushroom,‹ said Fleegle, pointing to a clearing on a ridge at the far end of the lake. Delasko, who ran outside moments la- ter, said she thought someone had blown up a boat on the lake. ›It just looked like confetti raining down all over the air above the lake,‹ she said.«; www.pittsburgh- live.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_12967.html

28) Täter-Kommunikation: Gedankenübertragung

  1. Ausführungen, Zusammenfassung und Animationen unter »Animation showing military precision of flight paths« auf Looking Glass News, 7.12.2005;
    www.lookingglassnews.org/viewstory.php?storyid=3907
    Obwohl die Website von team8plus bedauerlicherweise komplett aus dem Netz ver- schwunden ist, lässt sich die Animation weiterhin studieren, und zwar unter
    www.lookingglassnews.org/articles/dec/team83.jpeg
  2. Commission Report, S. 4: »The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet. All com- munications and flight profile data were normal. About this time the ›Fasten Seat- belt‹ sign would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have begun preparing for cabin service. … From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking [of AA 11] began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter.«
  3. Vgl. u.a. Frank Levi / team8plus, »Holes in the Radar – How the Plane Swaps Were Done«; http://letsrollforums.com/holes-radar-plane-swaps-t4261.html; sowie ders., »9-11: Holes in the Radar«; http://letsrollforums.com/911-commission-timelines-4-t20458.html?s=f5be6f61bff9e844b65392743ee84709&
p class="s2">29) Irrelevant: Raytheon

  1. 1 Informationen und Zitate nach Pressemitteilungen von Raytheon Technologies:
    »Raytheon designed and developed the differential GPS landing system under an Air Force contract for the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) program. More than 200 precision approaches with a military test aircraft have been accomplished to date.«; www.raytheon.com/products/jpals/)
  2. Sowie zwei Mitarbeiter von »Subunternehmern«, die ebenfalls mit dem Global-Hawk- Projekt betraut waren, die wir hier aber der Einfachheit halber hier nicht weiter beach- ten wollen: Carl Max Hammond (Flug 175) arbeitete für den Global-Hawk-Entwickler Mitre Corp.; www.mitre.org/news/events/tech03/sensors.html; Charles S. Falken- berg (Flug 77) entwickelte EOS Webster, ein Radar-Landkartensystem, integriert in die Global-Hawk-Steuerung; http://web.archive.org/web/20020302091225/http://ivanova.gsfc.nasa.gov/hdfeos/notes.html
  3. Nach Meldungen von CNN und USA today, 12.9.2001, befanden sich an Bord von AA 77: Stanley Hall, 68, Director of Program Management for Raytheon Electronics Warfare, verantwortlich für die Entwicklung von Anti-Radar-Techniken. An Bord von AA 11: Kenneth Waldie, 46, Senior Quality Control Engineer for Electronic Sys- tems, seit 17 Jahren bei Raytheon; David Kovalcin, 42, Senior Mechanical Engineer for Electronic Systems, seit 15 Jahren bei Raytheon; Peter Gay, 54, Vice President of Operations for Electronic Systems, seit über 28 Jahren bei Raytheon;
    www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/09/12/victim-capsule-flight11.htm; http://replay.web.archive.org/20010918054209/http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/victims/AA11.victims.html
  4. Seinen Dienst bei Raytheon als Vice-Director of Raytheon's Corporate Management hatte Homer erst kurz vor dem September 2001 angetreten, bis dahin hatte er (27 Jahre lang) für das Verteidigungsministerium gearbeitet: in der Vertragsabteilung; http://replay.web.archive.org/20020302174545/http://www.voice.neu.edu/011211/ homer.html. Aus unerfindlichen Gründen wurde er nach dem Anschlag einige Tage lang nicht als Passagier geführt, sondern als im Pentagon umgekommen; www.pownetwork.org/bios/mia_usa2.htm
  5. Vgl. in Sachen »Zufälle«, besonders zu diesem Punkt, John Doe II maßgebliches Theaterstück The Crime of The Millenium; http://johndoeii.blog.com/files/2011/01/TEXT.pdf
  6. Siehe die Auflistung bei CNN; www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/tenants2.html
  7. Jim Dwyer u.a., »Fighting to Live as the Towers Died«, in: New York Times, 26.5.2002; www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/nyregion/26WTC.html?ex=1154750400&en=a3b54ec14e1861bc&ei=5070

30) Der Pilot: Hani Hanjour

  1. »Four Planes, Four Coordinated Teams«, Washington Post, 20.9.2001; www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/graphics/attack/hijackers.html
  2. »Air Traffic Controllers Recall 9/11«, ABCNews, 24.10.2001; http://abcnews.go. com/2020/story?id=123822&page=1
  3. Zit.n. History Commons, »April 15, 1999: Hanjour Gets Pilot's License despite Dubi- ous Skills«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a041599hanjourlicense# a041599hanjourlicense
  4. Zit.n. Jim Yardley, »A Trainee Noted for Incompetence«, in: New York Times, 4.5.2002; www.nytimes.com/2002/05/04/us/a-trainee-noted-for-incompetence. html?pagewanted=1
  5. Collins, My Jihad, S. 248
  6. www.911myths.com/images/5/53/13120604--FBI-Summar y-about-Alleged- Flight-77-Hijacker-Nawaf-Alhazmi.pdf

31) Der Pentagon-Crash

  1. Z.B. www.youtube.com/watch?v=NgyPbUoe2iA
  2. Die »Rauchfahne« ist ein scheinbar starkes Argument gegen die offizielle Theorie, auf den veröffentlichten Bildern sei ein heranrasendes Passagierflugzeug zu sehen, denn Flugzeugturbinen verbrennen Kerosin, und Kerosin hinterlässt keine Rauch- spur, sondern verbrennt farblos. Eine Rakete hingegen, erst recht eine gerade erst abgefeuerte, zieht sehr wohl eine Rauchfahne hinter sich her. Wir geben aber zu be- denken, dass das sich dem Pentagon nähernde Flugobjekt mehrere am Rand des Highway stehende Lichtmasten umknickte, und zwar mittels seiner kerosingefüllten Tragflächen, so dass es durchaus als denkbar erscheint, dass die Maschine auf ihren letzten Metern aus verschiedenen Wunden brannte. Was dann eben auch eine große Rauchfahne erklären würde.
  3. Vgl. z.B. Griffin, Debunking 9/11 Debunking, S. 279
  4. Einen Überblick über die verschiedenen (abgelehnten) FOIA-Anfragen bietet http://911research.wtc7.net/pentagon/evidence/footage.html
  5. Laut Ablehnungsbescheid der zuständigen Behörden auf die FOIA-Anfrage von Ai- dan Monaghan am 30.8.2010: »Due to the investigation and litigation on this mat- ter, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) still has cognizance over these records.«; http://911blogger.com/news/2010-09-25/department-defense-images- pentagon-crash-scene-and-during-911-unavailable-controlled-fbi
  6. Meyssan, Pentagate
  7. Z.B. www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3iQuoyGIPo
  8. Vgl. Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, S. 61 ff. Sowie den kritischen Kommen- tar zu Griffins »Funden« auf 911myths.com unter http://911myths.com/index.php/Barbara_Olson_calls. Sowie Eric Larsons außerordentlich ausführliche »Critique of Griffin's 911 Fake Calls Theory« auf 911blogger.com; http://911blogger.com/ news/2011-02-10/critique-david-ray-griffin-s-911-fake-calls-theory.
    Dazu lohnt sich dann allerdings die zusätzliche Lektüre der ungefähr 50-seitigen Re- poste des kritisierten Griffin selbst, ebenso wie die Beistandslektüre aus Skeptiker- kreisen.
    Unter dem Info- und Desinfo-Strich bleibt indes bis heute offen, ob es an Bord von AA 77 überhaupt »Airphones« gab, von denen aus Hauptzeugin Barbara Olson ihren Mann Theodore im Justizministerium hätte erreichen können (nachdem das FBI of- fenbar die Verwendung eines Handy ausschloss, dank der im Moussaoui-Prozess vorgelegten Auswertungen). Unbeantwortet bleiben ebenfalls skeptische Fragen an die Skeptiker, kulminierend ungefähr in dieser: Falls 9/11 auf jeder Ebene ein gigan- tischer Verschwörer-Hoax war – wieso machten die genialen Planer ohne Not Fehler wie den, fragwürdige Anrufe von Bord der Maschinen aus schlampig zu inszenie- ren? Hätten wir nicht ohne diese Anrufe viel weniger Zweifel an der offiziellen Dar- stellung?
    Aufgrund der insgesamt gewichtigen Unsicherheiten verzichten wir daher nach gründlicher Prüfung der unsicheren Fakten- und Beweislage im Rahmen dieses Bu- ches auf eine weitere Vertiefung des Aspekts »Anrufe von Bord der Flüge 77 und 93«.
  9. Pilots for 9/11 Truth, »Phone call to NTSB regarding the above conflicts«. Das ist, wie auf der Seite angekündigt, tatsächlich ein »must see« resp. »must hear«; http://pilotsfor911truth.org/pentagon.html
  10. Vgl. Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, S. 63 ff.
  11. Zit.n. Filson, Air War over America, S. 66
  12. »Konspirologen« zeichnen sich üblicherweise durch unwissenschaftliches Vorgehen und einen Mangel an Sachkenntnis aus – ihnen genügt eine möglichst knackige Theorie wie »Osama war's« oder »Die Sonne kreist um die Erde«, Details werden ungern behandelt. Die Pilots for 9/11 Truth machen das seit Jahren anders, deshalb gestatten wir uns hier ein Beispiel aus ihrem Fragenkatalog »Questions For NTSB/ FBI Regarding Flight Data Recorder Information« abzudrucken (das lediglich die rätselhaften Daten aus der Flugschreiberauswertung betrifft). Die ursprünglich ein- gesetzte 9/11-Commission musste sich mit solchen Fragen nicht beschäftigen, die kommende wird es tun:
    1. The current FDR shows 480' MSL True Altitude, too high to hit the light poles. What are your findings of True Altitude at end of data recording 09:37:44. Why did you provide a Flight Data Recorder that shows the aircraft too high without a side letter of explanation? How did you come to your conclusion.
    2. What is the vertical speed at end of data recording :44. How did you come to your conclusion.
    3. What is the Absolute Altitude and end of data recording? How did you come to your conclusion.
    4. Why does the csv file show the altimeter being set in the baro cor column on the descent through FL180, but the animation altimeter does not show it being set? (This is a blatant cover-up to confuse the average layman in hopes no one would ad- just for local pressure to get True Altitude. Too bad for them we caught it).
    5. Why do the current G Forces for the last minute of data correspond to the changes in vertical speed, yet at end of data :44-:45 it shows an increase in vertical speed never accounting for any type of level off to be level with the lawn as shown in the DoD video?
    6. Do you have any video showing a clear impact and/or of the plane on its approach to impact?«; http://pilotsfor911truth.org/pentagon.html

32) E4-B: Überwachung von oben

  1. Hier ein Film: www.youtube.com/watch?v=2crnOsx4Eks&feature=related. Die
    beste Quellensammlung findet sich wie üblich in den History Commons, »(9:41 a.m.-
    9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Mysterious White Jet Seen Circling above White House«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a942whitejet#a942white jet.
  2. Mark H. Gaffney, »Why Did the World's Most Advanced Electronics Warfare Plane Circle Over The White House on 9/11?«, S. 15: »Linda Brookhart says she snapped the picture before the towering plume of smoke became visible at the Pentagon.«; www.journalof911studies.com/volume/200704/911MysteryPlane.pdf
  3. Gaffney, The 9/11 Mystery Plane and the Vanishing of America, S. 46 ff.
  4. U.S. Air Force, E4-B Factsheet: »The E-4B has electromagnetic pulse protection, an electrical system designed to support advanced electronics and a wide variety of new communications equipment. Other improvements include nuclear and thermal effects shielding, acoustic control, an improved technical control facility and an up- graded air-conditioning system for cooling electrical components. An advanced sa- tellite communications system improves worldwide communications among strate- gic and tactical satellite systems and the airborne operations center.«; www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=99
  5. Joe Dejka, »Inside Stratcom on September 11 – Offutt Excercise took real life twist«, in: Omaha World-Herald, 27.2.2002; http://classic-web.archive.org/web/20050206084541/http://close.batcave.net/GlobalGuardian.html
  6. Jedenfalls gingen die Teilnehmer noch im März 2001 davon aus. Beispielhaft das Fachblatt Space Observer der Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, das auf Seite 2 seiner Ausgabe vom 23.3.2001 die »Global Guardian«-Übung noch für den Oktober 2001 ankündigt; http://classic-web.archive.org/web/20030320100542/http://www.peterson.af.mil/21sw/observer/23mar01.pdf
  7. Gaffney, The 9/11 Mystery Plane and the Vanishing of America, S. 52
  8. Zu Ablauf und (strittigem) Ende der Übung Global Guardian vgl. History Commons, »(10:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Global Guardian Exercise Formally Canceled«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1044guardianends#a1044guardianends
    An Zufällen interessierten Lesern legen wir gern ans Herz, »Offutt« in einen beliebi- gen Browser oder gleich bei History Commons einzugeben. Dass Admiral Mies zu Beginn der Übung mit wohlhabenden Charity-Gästen des zweitreichsten Mannes der Welt, Warren Buffett, auf der Militärbasis frühstückte, gehört ebenso zu den Merk- und Zufälligkeiten des 11. September wie die oft kolportierte Tatsache, dass Anne Tatlock, CEO des 44-Milliarden-Privatvermögensverwalters Fiduciary Trust, an diesem Morgen ebenfalls in Offutt Kaffee trank – und nicht wie sonst an jedem Tag an ihrem Schreibtisch im 90. Stock des WTC-Südturms, der gerade von einem Flugzeug getroffen wurde. Dass der Vorsitzende der 9/11-Commission, Thomas Kean, dem Aufsichtsrat von Fiduciary angehörte, verbuchen wir allerdings erst recht unter Zufall.
  9. Gaffney, The 9/11 Mystery Plane and the Vanishing of America, S. 103

33) WTC 1 und 2

  1. CNN, 12.9.2001; http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/new.york.terror/
  2. http://dalje.com/slike/dokumenti_3/g2009/m02/x36196221065491975.pdf
  3. »911 Lawsuit – Rodriguez Vs Bush« auf Angels for Truth; http://angelsfortruth.com/Rodriguez.vs.Bush.html
  4. www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXSHm3CdHf4
  5. www.journalof911studies.com/articles/Article_5_118Witnesses_WorldTradeCenter. pdf
  6. www.youtube.com/watch?v=djwBCEmHrSE
  7. http://911research.wtc7.net/wtc/analysis/collapses/steel.html
  8. http://911research.wtc7.net/wtc/analysis/collapses/concrete.html
  9. http://nasathermalimages.com/
  10. http://911research.wtc7.net/wtc/evidence/metallurgy/index.html
  11. www.bentham.org/open/tocpj/articles/V002/7TOCPJ.htm?TOCPJ/2009/00000002/00000001/7TOCPJ.SGM
  12. Dazu ein Interview mit Harrit auf 911 Archiv.net; www.911-archiv.net/world-trade-center/wtc/sprengstoff-im-wtc-interview-mit-dr-harrit-ueber-911.html
  13. Abstract und dann per Download auch die gesamte Studie unter www.bentham.org/open/tocpj/articles/V002/7TOCPJ.htm?TOCPJ/2009/00000002/00000001/7TOCPJ.SGM; vgl. auch »Explosivstoffe im WTC-Staub gefunden!« auf 911 Archiv. net;
    www.911-archiv.net/world-trade-center/wtc/911-aktives-energetisches-material-im-staub-der-world-trade-center-katastrophe-entdeckt.html
  14. Vgl. diverse Einträge auf 911 Archiv.net: www.911-archiv.net/world-trade-center/ wtc/sprengstoff-im-wtc-interview-mit-dr-harrit-ueber-911.html; www.911-archiv. net/world-trade-center/wtc/steven-e-jones-14-punkte-uebereinstimmung-mit-nist.html; www.911-archiv.net/debunking-of-debunkers/allgemein/wtc-staubanalyse-dr-harrit-vs-dr-rancour.html; www.911-archiv.net/debunking-of-debunkers/allgemein/wtc-staubanalyse-harrit-ries.html

34) WTC 7

  1. http://911research.wtc7.net/wtc/analysis/wtc7/speed.html
  2. »Engineers Have a Culprit in the Strange Collapse of 7 World Trade Center: Diesel Fuel«, New York Times, 29.11.2001;
    www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/nyregion/nation-challenged-site-engineers-have-culprit-strange-collapse-7-world-trade. html?scp=3&sq=%22uncontrolled%20fire%22&st=cse
  3. www.fema.gov/rebuild/mat/wtcstudy.shtm
  4. www.ae911truth.org/de/news/57-news-releases-by-others/426-freefall-and-building-7-on-911.html
  5. http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/techbeat/tbx2008_1120_wtc7.htm
  6. CNN, 21.8.2008; www.youtube.com/watch?v=7oG2iwBi9F0
  7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermal_expansion
  8. www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7SwOT29gbc&feature=player_embedded
  9. »Pursuant to Section 7(d) of the National Construction Safety Team Act, I hereby find that the disclosure of the information described below, received by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (›NIST‹), in connection with its investigation of the technical causes of the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers and World Trade Center Building 7 on September 11,2001, might jeopardize public safety. Therefore, NIST shall not release the following information:
    1. All input and results files of the ANSYS 16-story collapse initiation model with detailed connection models that were used to analyze the structural response to thermal loads, break element source code, ANSYS script files for the break elements, custom executable ANSYS file, and all Excel spreadsheets and other supporting cal- culations used to develop floor connection failure modes and capacities
    2. All input files with connection material properties and all results files of the LS- DYNA 47-story global collapse model that were used to simulate sequential structu- ral failures leading to collapse, and all Excel spreadsheets and other supporting cal- culations used to develop floor connection failure modes and capacities.
      – Patrick Gallagher, Director National Institute of Standards and Technology,
      9.7.2009.«; http://cryptome.org/nist070709.pdf

35) Silverstein: unvorbereitet

  1. Brill, After, S. 18 f.
  2. Walther, Der zensierte Tag, S. 57 ff.
  3. Handelsblatt 19.10.2006; www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken-versicherungen/der-schadensfall-world-trade-center-ist-abgeschlossen;1152152
  4. Brill, After, S. 18
  5. Silversteins »pull it« findet sich z.B. unter www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WYdAJQV100
  6. Jeffrey Scott Shapiro, »Shame on Jesse Ventura!«, Fox News.com 22.4.2010:
    »I was working as a journalist for Gannett News at Ground Zero that day, and I re- member very clearly what I saw and heard. Although I arrived at Ground Zero shortly after the Twin Towers fell, I was in the danger zone created by Building 7 from the moment it collapsed in the afternoon, an event that is one of the key cor- nerstones of the 9/11 conspiracy theory Governor Ventura and many 9/11 ›Truthers‹ allege that government explosives caused the afternoon collapse of Building 7. This is false. I know this because I remember watching all 47 stories of Building 7 sud- denly and silently crumble before my eyes. Shortly before the building collapsed, several NYPD officers and Con-Edison workers told me that Larry Silverstein, the property developer of One World Financial Center was on the phone with his insu- rance carrier to see if they would authorize the controlled demolition of the building
    – since its foundation was already unstable and expected to fall. A controlled demo- lition would have minimized the damage caused by the building's imminent collapse and potentially save lives. Many law enforcement personnel, firefighters and other journalists were aware of this possible option. There was no secret. There was no conspiracy. While I was talking with a fellow reporter and several NYPD officers, Building 7 suddenly collapsed, and before it hit the ground, not a single sound ema- nated from the tower area. There were no explosives; I would have heard them. In fact, I remember that in those few seconds, as the building sank to the ground that I was stunned by how quiet it was.«; www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/04/22/jeffrey-scott-shapiro-jesse-venture-book-lies-truthers-ground-zero-sept-shame/
  7. Vgl. History Commons, »(2:00 p.m.-2:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001: Decision Made to Abandon WTC 7«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a200abandonw tc7#a200abandonwtc7

36) United 23

  1. Die einzelnen Messer-in-den-Sitzen-Artikel finden sich hier: Time, www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175953,00.html; Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk/september11/story/0,11209,601830,00.html; Chicago Tribune, http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20021124045337/www.chicagotribune.com/news/showcase/chi-0109230432sep23.story?coll=chi-newsspecials-hed; Independent, http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20010924205148/http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=95895; CNN, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/15/inv.air.canada/index.html
  2. Vgl. Spencer, Touching History, S. 103 f.; sowie Zusammenfassung und Quellen- sammlung bei History Commons, »(After 9:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Flight 23 Cancels Takeoff, Possibly Avoids Being Hijacked«; http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a900hijackingaverted#a900hijackingaverted

37) Intermezzo: Anthrax

  1. Vgl. vor allem die zuständige Lokalpresse, nämlich z.B. »Bruce Ivins's lawyer, colle-
    ague share details FBI left out«, Frederick News Post vom 5.12.2010,: »Meryl Nass, a physician who has written extensively about anthrax vaccines and the Amerithrax investigation, gave the seminar attendees some insight into Ivins' final days. Ivins overdosed on Tylenol PM on July 26, 2008, and died on July 29. But Nass said, medi- cally speaking, the outcome of his overdose should have been different. Ivins was brought to Frederick Memorial Hospital by an ambulance early on the morning of July 27. He was under constant surveillance, and Nass said the FBI agents watching him could have, but didn't, inform the doctors that he had purchased two bottles of Tylenol PM a few days earlier. Nass said there is no evidence that the FBI agents helped get Ivins medical attention quicker or let anyone know about the Tylenol purchase. ›It takes from two to several days for liver failure to occur after ingesting a large dose of Tylenol,‹ according to a document Nass handed out at the seminar. She said there is an effective antidote, called N-acetyl cysteine, that helps the body deto- xify the substance created as the liver metabolizes the Tylenol. Nass said death rates from a Tylenol overdose is »extremely rare when this safe, easily available treatment is given in a timely manner.«; http://www.wtop.com/?nid=858&sid=2188906
  2. Robert Schmidt u.a., »Scientist in Anthrax Case Said to Have Killed Himself (Up- date4)«, auf Bloomberg.com, 1.8.2008; http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKQxd_8Ywgpg&refer=home
  3. Vgl. John Byrne, »Anthrax spores don't match dead researcher's samples«, auf: The Raw Story, 26.2.2009 http://rawstory.com/news/2008/Anthrax_spores_dont_match_dead_researchers_0226.html
  4. Vgl. Glenn Greenwald, »Doubts over the anthrax case intensify – except among much of the media«, auf Salon.com, 18. August 2008; www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2008/08/18/anthrax/print.html; sowie Jay Epstein, »The Anthrax Attacks Remain Unsolved«, in: Wall Street Journal, 24.1.2010;
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704541004575011421223515284.html
  5. Gary Matsumato, »Key Expert Calls FBIs Theory About Accused Anthrax Terrorist ›Impossible‹«, auf ProPublica, 25.4.2011;
    www.alternet.org/story/146614/key_expert_calls_fbi%27s_theory_about_accused_anthrax_terrorist_%27impossible%27
  6. Vgl. abermals Greenwald und Epstein, wie soeben angeführt
  7. Vgl. History Commons, »June 27, 2008: Former Anthrax Attacks Suspect Hatfill Exo- nerated; Paid Nearly $6 Million to Settle Suit against US Government«;
    www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a062708hatfillpayment#a062708hatfillpayment
  8. Matt Fair, »Holt: FBI anthrax investigation is itself subject of probe«, in: The Times 16.9.2010; www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2010/09/holt_fbi_anthrax_investigation.html
  9. Brill, After, S. 37
  10. Chaim Kupferberg, »There's Something About Omar. Truth, Lies, and The Legend of 9/11«, auf Global Research, 21.10.2003: »To anyone familiar with covert operations, the above item would perhaps set off alarm bells. In theory, if Atta and his comrades were intelligence assets, they would be handled by resident, intelligence-connected, ›babysitters‹ whose job it would be to set up accommodations and provide support where needed. Were the Irishes ›babysitters‹ in an intelligence operation?«; www. globalresearch.ca/articles/KUP310A.html
  11. Vgl. »FBI: Hijacker-anthrax link coincidental«, CNN, 15.10.2001; http://edition.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/conditions/10/15/anthrax.hijackers/
  12. Eric Lipton, »Doubts persist among Anthrax Suspect's Colleagues«, in: New York Times, 8.8.2008: »In 2000, US military personnel are being required under the th- reat of court-martial to be inoculated with an anthrax vaccine. But the vaccine, known as Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed (AVA), is not working very well and some sol- diers are getting sick. This results in a loud public outcry lasting into 2001.«; www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/washington/09vaccine.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1
  13. Robert B. Myers, Lansing Economic Club Presentation, 18.1.2001 (auf der BioPort- Website (s.u., Archiv) unter News Room t News Releases; http://replay.web.archive.org/20041126203137/http://www.bioport.com/default.asp?page=Press Releases/BioPort/PR11.htm&menulevel=3
  14. Vgl. History Commons, »2000-2001: USAMRIID Scientists Have Trouble with Anth- rax Vaccine; FBI Will Later Call This the Motive for Anthrax Attacks, Suspect Ivins«:
    »Ivins is working at USAMRIID, the US Army's top bioweapons laboratory, and he and about six other USAMRIID scientists were assigned by the Defense Department to fix the problems with the vaccine so production could resume. In a June 2000 E- Mail message, Ivins writes, ›Unfortunately, since the BioPort people aren't scientists, the task of solving their problem has fallen on us.‹«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a2000bioportivins#a2000bioportivins
    »Doubts Persist Among Anthrax Suspect's Colleagues«, New York Times, 8.8.2008:
    »The criticism, which reached its peak in 2000 and early 2001, was clearly starting to get on Dr. Ivins's nerves. ›I think the **** is about to hit the fan … big time,‹ he wrote in a July 2000 e-mail message about the inoculation program, according to a government affidavit. ›It's just a fine mess.‹«; www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/washington/09vaccine.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1
  15. Vgl. New York Times, ebd.: »Dr. Ivins and other researchers, however, had been wor- king on a more advanced alternative vaccine — considered safer and more effective
    — so there was no reason for such a rash act, his former colleagues say. ›There was a lot of consternation, a lot of pressure to rescue this thing,‹ said Jeffrey Adamovicz, one of Dr. Ivins's fellow researchers at the time. ›But if AVA failed, he had his next vaccine candidate. It was well on its way to what looked to be a very bright future.‹«
  16. »In December 2001, BioPort obtained FDA approval for its newly-renovated anthrax vaccine manufacturing facilities. With approval of a contractor to fill the vaccine in vials, BioPort received final approval to distribute vaccine from its newly renovated facilities in January 2002.«; http://replay.web.archive.org/20060311232419/http://www.bioport.com/NewsRoom/NewsReleases/BioPort/2002-Jan31.pdf
  17. Am 30.6.1999 führte El-Hibri vor dem »Subcommittee on National Security, Vete- rans Affairs, and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reforms« aus: »Three Companies currently hold voting equity in BioPort: Intervac LLC and Intervac Management LLC, which are both Maryland limited liability com- panies, and Michigan Biologic Products, Inc., a Michigan Corporation. Intervac LLC is the controlling shareholder. Intervac LLC is owned by Admiral William J. Crowe,Jr., my wife Nancy and me, and I & F Holdings N.V., a Netherlands Antilles invest- ment company owned by my father Ibrahim El-Hibri. As mentioned earlier, I & F Holdings is an investment company in biotech operations, which previously had in- vested in the management buy-out of Proton Products Ltd … Admiral Crowe and I and the controlling members of Intervac LLC.«;
    http://replay.web.archive.org/20041126203137/http://www.bioport.com/default.asp?page=PressReleases/BioPort/PR11.htm&menulevel=3 unter t News Room t News Releases t Press Releases – June 30, 1999
  18. »Federal officials recently re-stated their concerns about the level of vulnerability in the event of a massive airborne anthrax attack. This contract allwos other agencies such as Homeland Security, Health and Human Services and the State Department to obtain BioThrax through the Defence Department‹, (BioPort-President Bob) Kra- mer said«;
    http://replay.web.archive.org/20040212073144/http://www.bioport. com/newsroom/newsreleases/bioport/2004-Jan09.PDF
  19. History Commons, »Evening, September 11, 2001: White House Staff, Including Cheney's, Start Taking Anthrax Antibiotic Cipro«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a091101ciprocheney#a091101ciprocheney

38) Whistleblower

  1. 1 Vgl. Ganser, NATO-Geheimarmeen in Europa; www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll-
    topic.cfm?lng=en&id=15301; »Das blutige Schwert der CIA«, Spiegel, 19.11.1990; www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13501822.html; EU-Parlament, 22.11.1990;
    www.cloeser.org/ext/Gladio-Entschlie%DFung_des_EP_von_1990.pdf
  2. Clarke, Against All Enemies, S. 126: »Conspiracy Theorists simultaneoulsy hold two contrary beliefs: a) that the U.S. government is so incompetent that it can miss ex- planations that the theorists can uncover, and b) that the U.S. government can keep a big and juicy secret. The first belief has some validity. The second idea is pure fan- tasy.«
  3. History Commons, »Context of ›August 8, 2009: Sibel Edmonds Testifies Under
    Oath‹«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=complete_911_timeline_6263EdmondsUnderOath
  4. »Ryland: A Sibel Edmonds ›Bombshell‹ – Bin Laden Worked for U.S. Until 9/11«, aufBrad Blog, 31.7.2009; www.bradblog.com/?p=7332
  5. www.justacitizen.com/images/Gallery%20Draft2%20for%20Web.htm
  6. Interview mit Sibel Edmonds, September 2009; http://911blogger.com/node/21416
  7. History Commons, »August 4-25, 1998: Embassy Bomber's Arrest Points to Vital Al- Qaeda Communications Hub«; www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=mike_feghali
  8. Für die Explosion eines Pan-Am-Jets über dem schottischen Lockerbie wurden libysche Terroristen verantwortlich gemacht. Nachdem Susan Lindauer von ihrem CIA- Kontaktmann Richard Fuisz – einem Pharmaforscher und Unternehmer, der in den 80er Jahren für die CIA in Syrien tätig war – über die ihm zufolge eigentlich aus Sy- rien stammenden Täter informiert worden war, brachte sie diese Informationen An- fang 2000 an die Öffentlichkeit. UN-Diplomaten forderten daraufhin eine Aussage- genehmigung für Fuisz, die jedoch vom State Department aus Gründen der »nationalen Sicherheit« verweigert wurde. Vgl. dazu Neil Mackay u.a., » Lockerbie: CIA witness gagged by US government; Lockerbie trial«, in: The Sunday Herald, 28.5.2000;
    http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20000528/ai_n13949725/
  9. »Susan Lindauer: Secret Charges and the Patriot Act«, auf Top Scoops, 10.3.2009;www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0903/S00130.htm
  10. Zit.n. »Around the Nation – Case Dropped Against Md. Woman«, Washington Post, 17.1.2009; www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011604599.html
  11. Alan Feuer, »Antiwar Activist Returns to Court for Iraq Spy Case«, in: New York Times, 18.6.2008; www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/nyregion/18spy.html?_r=1&scp=7&sq=Susan%20P.%20Lindauer&st=cse; Michael Collins, »The American Cassandra Series«, auf Extreme Prejudice; http://extremeprejudiceusa.wordpress.com/american-cassandra-series-by-michael-collins-3/
  12. »The Journey of a Wall Street Whistleblower«, auf 911 Truth.org, 1.3.2005;www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20050301231231793
  13. History Commons, »Mid-1990s: Al-Kadi Claims Good Relationship with Cheney«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1990sqadicheney#a1990sqadicheney
  14. »The Journey of a Wall Street Whistleblower«, auf 911 Truth.org, 1.3.2005;www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20050301231231793
  15. Bergantino im National Public Radio, 8.12.2002: »The worst-case scenario is that this is a situation where this was planned for a very long time to establish a company in this country and in the computer software business that would target federal agencies and gain access to key government data to essentially help terrorists launch another attack.«;
    www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/021208-secure01.htm
  16. History Commons, »October 1998: Vulgar Betrayal Investigation Nearly Shut Down«;www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1098alqadi#a1098alqadi
  17. History Commons, »August 3, 1999: Wright removed from Vulgar Betrayal Investiga- tion«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a080399betrayalshutdown#a080399betrayalshutdown
  18. History Commons, »1986-October 1999: New Jersey Firm Investors List Is ›Who's Who of Designated Terrorists‹«; www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a86bmiinvestors#a86bmiinvestors
  19. Lisa Myers, »Did al-Qaida trainee warn FBI before 9/11?«, MSNBC, 26.7.2004;www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5131524/
  20. Antony Barnett u.a., »UK spymasters shrugged off al-Qaeda recruit's warning«, in: Observer, 6.6.2004; www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/06/september11.terrorism
  21. History Commons, »April 2000: Would-Be Hijacker Tells FBI About Plot to Fly Plane into US Building«; www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=niaz_khan
  22. History Commons, »Profile: Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU)«; http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=radical_fundamentalist_unit
  23. »Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller. An edited version of the agent's 13-page letter«, Time Magazine, 21.5.2002; www.time.com/time/covers/1101020603/memo.html
  24. Eine Zusammenfassung zur Sabotage der Moussaoui-Fahndung durch die FBI-Zen- trale findet sich im 9/11 Archiv.net:
    www.911-archiv.net/vorauswissen/warnungen/sabotage-im-fall-qzacharias-moussaouiq.html
  25. »Senate report: FBI still unprepared«, auf Salon.com, 3.3.2003; www.salon.com/news/feature/2003/03/03/fbi/index.html
  26. »Interview with April Gallop«, auf George Washington's Blog, 13.7.2006; http://georgewashington.blogspot.com/2006/07/interview-with-april-gallop.html
  27. Mary Maxwell, »April Gallop vs Cheney, Rumsfeld, Myers – 9/11 Court Case«, auf OpEdNews.com, 25.4.2011;
    www.opednews.com/articles/April-Gallop-vs-Cheney- Ru-by-Mary-Maxwell-110425-185.html; Urteilsbegründung hier: www.centerfor911justice.org/news/chin=20decision-1.pdf
  28. »The fix is in: Bush Cousin presides over 9/11 suit against Cheney, Rumsfeld, My- ers«, auf Truth and Shadows, 10.4.2011; http://truthandshadows.wordpress.com/2011/04/10/the-fix-is-in-bush-cousin-presides-over-911-suit-against-cheney-rumsfeld/#more-551
  29. www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=4&xmldoc=In+FCO+20110427118. xml&docbase=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR&SizeDisp=7